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ABSTRACT 
The assessment of personality provides the clinician with an opportunity to 
gather idiosyncratic information about an individual; information that is 
potentially useful in the diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of that patient. 
In the area of psychopathology, personality has been viewed historically 
within the context of categorical diagnoses of personality disorder. This 
thesis critically reviews a recently proposed theory of personality that has 
incorporated normal and abnormal personality into a dimensional system 
of classification. The biosocial theory of personality and in its expanded 
form, the psychobiological model of temperament and character, were 
proposed by C.R.Cloninger and his colleagues in an attempt to provide a 
theoretical base from which to test causal hypotheses about personality in 
psychopathology. The theory is discussed in terms of its relevance to the 
understanding of personality structure, development, and psychopathology. 
It is concluded that despite limitations, this theory has an important 
contribution to make to further resear~h investigating the influence of 
personality variables in a clinical setting. 
CHAPTERl 
Personality in the clinical setting 
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONALITY INFORMATION: 
The concept of personality has fascinated theorists, from the early 
philosophers through to today's personality psychologists. Throughout 
history theorists have proposed new explanations and definitions of the term, 
to the extent that each writer tends to develop their own idiosyncratic 
definition of personality. It is a topic, however, that remains strangely elusive 
in the face of this extensive history of theorising and research. Despite 
countless attempts to explain and predict personality variation, the field is still 
lacking in fundamental areas. As one writer stated, there seems to be a large 
gap between what is written in the literature and what actually presents to us 
in everyday life, both as clinicians and in our general dealings with society 
(Pervin, 1985). 
The assessment of personality is often thought to be the specialist domain of 
psychologists. Such a view neglects the reality that most members of society 
constantly assess the personality of those with whom they come into contact. 
The vast language of personality descriptors (which has long been disparaged 
because of its contribution to confusion in the field) is testimony to the 
importance of the construct in our society (McCrae & John, 1992). Just as lay-
persons intuitively assess personality in all of their social dealings, 
psychologists and psychiatrists assess personality in all of their patients. The 
difference lies in the scientific tools and knowledge that the clinician brings to 
the situation. 
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It is possible, however, that the majority of personality assessment undertaken 
by clinicians is carried out intuitively, using much the same methods as the 
lay-person. Despite the vast array of personality questionnaires, schedules, 
structured assessments, projective tests and other tools, clinicians often gather 
personality material in an unstructured way. It follows from this that 
clinicians use this information in a similar manner, implicitly translating it into 
an idiosyncratic protocol for their dealings with each patient. It is this 
intuitive process of data-gathering and utilisation that occupies the gap 
between research and everyday practice. 
Of course, not all personality information is gathered informally. 
Psychologists and psychiatrists during the last century have developed many 
different methods of gathering and measuring personality information. 
Widiger and Frances (1985) state that the approach of psychologists to 
personality theory, measurement, and classification, has been quite different to 
that of psychiatrists. While the focus of psychologists has been the 
psychometric measurement of dimensional personality variation in the 
general population, psychiatrists have concentrated on the categorical 
classification of personality pathology in clinical populations. For many years 
these two fields of research have remained separate with little or no 
interaction between them. Even the field of clinical psychology has only 
recently begun to integrate information from the two. 
In the psychopathological literature, personality disorders have commanded 
more attention than has the influence of personality per se. Information about 
personality pathology is inevitably assessed at a more concrete level, simply 
because in many cases it is impossible to ignore. As Perry and Vaillant (1989) 
have stated, "patients with personality disorders continually demonstrate to 
mental health professionals the limits of their expertise. They crowd the 
rosters of clinic dropouts, of treatment failures and of referrals to other 
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agencies" (p. 1352). 
As a result, it is the study of personality disorders that has prompted 
recognition of the importance of personality information in the field of 
psychopathology. Evidence that the amount and type of preexisting 
personality problems can influence the predisposition, course, and treatment 
response of various psychopathological disorders has forced a reconsideration 
of personality influences on mental disorders (Frances, 1980; Hyler & Frances, 
1985; Reich & Green, 1991). Despite a recent increase in clinical and research 
interest, however, the interaction of personality and psychopathology remains 
a complex topic with a great deal more questions than answers. Some of the 
major difficulties in the area of personality disorders will be discussed in this 
introduction. Historically, these problems have inspired only criticism and 
rejection of the concept, but recently there appears to be a new sense of 
enthusiasm as researchers attempt to solve or alleviate them. 
The concept of personality disorder itself remains controversial, but at the 
same time it is clear that personality information is considered an essential 
component in mental health assessment. This has necessitated a shift of focus 
toward discovering the best way to conceptualise and use such information. 
This thesis will discuss these issues from the perspective of clinical 
psychology. First, four of the major topics of debate surrounding the 
personality disorders will be discussed as an introduction to the difficulties 
researchers and clinicians face when working in this area. Later, in order to 
limit the coverage of what is a vast area of theory and research, discussion will 
focus on a recently proposed theory of personality. This theory will be 
critically examined as an illustration of how models of personality structure 
can assist our understanding of the interaction of personality and 
psychopathology. 
2. LACK OF STANDARDISED MEASUREMENT: 
For many years knowledge of the personality disorders was confined to 
clinical anecdote. Classification depended largely on the clinician's theoretical 
biases and the influence of respected experts working in specific areas, such as 
Cleckley's (1975) descriptions of the psychopathic personality, and Kernberg's 
(1975) portrayal of the borderline and narcissistic personality structures. 
Many of the established theories of personality disorder were grounded in the 
psychoanalytic tradition (Kemberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971), yet competing theories 
proposed different variations of the disorders, each with a separate label and 
varying in terms of their underlying aetiology. While these descriptions were 
rich in their portrayal of specific personality disorders, they provided little 
standardisation for clinicians working with such individuals. 
As a result of this historical precedent, personality diagnoses came to be seen 
by many as diffuse and unreliable. The categories and labels used were 
considered to be arbitrary, and little sound research evidence existed to clarify 
the reasoning behind their proposed origins and structure. In the 1960's and 
1970' s, personality disorder became a clear example of the deleterious effects 
of psychiatric diagnosis, as argued by theorists such as Szasz (1961). In many 
cases, it was argued, the person's inability to fit into society was what resulted 
in the diagnosis, rather than any inherent disorder or problem the patient had. 
Others believed that such criticism was misguided. Kendell (1975), for 
example, maintained that it is not the diagnosis itself that creates prejudice 
against patients, but rather the fact that the patient is indeed, "crazy, or 
manipulative, or unable to cope with the demands of everyday life" (p. 8). He 
argued that if labelling is involved at all, it is the situation of being a 
psychiatric patient that is important to the individual and society, rather than 
a specific diagnosis. 
4 
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This debate resulted in a reconsideration of the methods of classification used 
at that time. The task was to increase the reliability and applicability of 
psychiatric diagnosis and classification to meet the needs of a changing field of 
mental health. The American Psychiatric Association's answer to this 
challenge was the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-III) first published in 1980. Four major innovations were included in the 
DSM-III that, although rejected by some, were seen by the majority to be a vast 
improvement in psychiatric nosology (Spitzer, Williams, & Skodol, 1980). 
The first of these improvements was the provision of operational definitions of 
disorders that were descriptive and empirical, in order to avoid controversy 
over aetiology. The second was a revision of the grouping of clinical 
syndromes so that disorders were grouped together according to underlying 
themes, such as the affective disorders, for example. Third, and related to each 
of these decisions, was the introduction of a new nomenclature. Theory (and 
controversy) bound labels such as neuroses were discarded in favour of new, 
less controversial labels such as somatoform disorder. Finally, a new 
multiaxial format was introduced that allowed the recording of information 
relevant to the clinical syndromes and to enable a comprehensive assessment 
of the individual (Williams, 1985). The clinical syndromes were placed on the 
first axis, while the second was reserved for the personality disorders and 
specific developmental disorders. A third axis recorded physical disorders or 
conditions, and these three constituted the formal diagnosis of a psychiatric 
patient. In addition, two further axes were provided for use in special clinical 
and research settings to measure severity of psychosocial stressors (Axis IV) 
and assess adaptive functioning (Axis V). 
The impact of the DSM-III was perhaps most striking in the area of personality 
disorders. The decision to place personality disorders on a separate axis 
demonstrated a recognition of the importance of information about 
personality pathology. By separating personality disturbance from other Axis 
I disorders, the stable and enduring nature of the personality disorders was 
highlighted, and clinicians were encouraged to pay more attention to their 
influence on primary disturbances such as major depression or the anxiety 
disorders (Spitzer et al., 1980). The extent to which the utilisation of the 
personality disorder diagnosis was influenced by the new system is indicated 
in a study of the impact of the DSM-ID on diagnostic practices which found a 
twofold increase in the number of personality diagnoses after the introduction 
of the new system (Loranger, 1990). 
The advent of the DSM-III also had implications for those researching the 
personality disorders. The historical lack of standardisation and reliability of 
personality diagnosis had left researchers unsure as to whether their research 
was comparable to others due to the differing definitions involved. The DSM-
III gave researchers a common language and resulted in an immediate 
upsurge in research interest in the area. Following from this the number of 
research articles concerned with personality disorders has increased greatly 
since the introduction of the DSM-III (Loranger, Lenzenweger, Gartner, 
Susman, Herzig, Zammit, Gartner, Abrahms, & Young, 1991). 
3. FOCUS ON CATEGORICAL DISORDER: 
While the DSM-III helped revolutionise the classification of mental disorder, 
the system was readily acknowledged to be far from perfect. Several major 
difficulties still exist within the system, and the section on the personality 
disorders is seen to be one of the most problematic. Many of these problems 
are believed to stem from the emphasis on mutually exclusive categories of 
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personality disorder in the DSM-III and its revision (DSM-III-R) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987). Historically, the field of mental health has 
considered personality only in terms of disorder, and because mental disorder 
has traditionally been defined in a categorical manner, so too have the 
personality disorders. Such a conceptualisation views personality disordered 
individuals as qualitatively different from those with normal personality 
structure. 
The categorical conceptualisation of personality pathology has resulted in 
many classificatory problems. Personality disorders are rarely manifest in a 
single clear-cut diagnosis, and it has been demonstrated that multiple 
personality diagnoses are the rule rather than the exception (Pfohl, Coryell, 
Zimmerman, & Stangl, 1987). In addition, this overlap does not appear to be 
random, with some diagnoses systematically overlapping with others. For 
example, borderline personality disorder is rarely found by itself, and is often 
difficult to distinguish from histrionic, antisocial and narcissistic personality 
disorders (Tyrer, 1988). 
There are also difficulties distinguishing between personality pathology and 
other disorders. Hyler and Frances (1985) describe four ways in which the two 
can interact; (a) personality disorder may predispose to an Axis I disorder, (b) 
a chronic and mild Axis I disorder may look like an Axis II disorder, (c) the 
disorders may be different expressions of the same aetiology, or (d) they may 
occur coincidentally. They conclude that whichever of these alternatives is the 
case, personality problems have a dramatic impact on the course and 
treatment of an Axis I disorder and as such, deserve further investigation. 
Categorical diagnoses of personality disorder represent one small part of the 
wealth of personality variables that may impact on the individual's 
functioning. Subthreshold conditions and adaptive personality traits are two 
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types of information that are lost when categorical diagnoses are used. 
Growing discontent with the categorical diagnosis of personality disorders has 
led to several researchers suggesting that the system be replaced with a 
dimensional one. A dimensional approach to classification views personality 
disorder as an extreme manifestation of normal personality traits, rather than 
qualitatively different as a categorical system implies. Opposition to the 
introduction of a dimensional system still exists, however, and this debate will 
be discussed more fully in chapter two. 
4. PROBLEMS IN TREATMENT: 
Perhaps one of the most important problems in the area of personality 
disorders is the lack of successful treatment options. Gorton and Akhtar in 
their 1990 review of treatment issues could only echo the words of Widiger 
and Frances (1985), who five years earlier had stated, "one can justifiably 
argue that a discussion of the treatment of the personality disorders is 
premature ... and there is no body of systematic research on the optimal 
treatment of personality disorders" (Gorton & Akhtar, 1990, p. 46; Widiger & 
Frances, 1985a, p. 621). The few partially successful treatments described in 
the literature are usually very intensive, requiring large amounts of resources 
to produce small gains (Kernberg, 1984; Kohut, 1971; Vaglum, Friis, Irion, 
Johns, Karterua, Larsen, & Vaglum, 1990). As a result, many clinicians feel 
limited in their knowledge of and ability to provide adequate treatment for 
individuals with these disorders. 
Personality disorders are by definition made up of enduring personality traits 
that are inflexible and maladaptive. This definition compounds the problem 
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of perceived untreatability as it assumes that personality disorder is stable 
over time, therefore unchanging with or without treatment. It is well known 
that a personality diagnosis tends to follow a patient and that such diagnoses 
carry negative connotations. Relatively recent research shows that 
psychiatrists form pejorative, judgemental, and rejecting attitudes toward 
patients with a previous diagnosis of personality disorder, and that these 
patients are perceived as less deserving of care than those without such a 
diagnosis (Lewis & Appleby, 1988). The reasons for such attitudes are 
complex but it is likely that the lack of effective treatment options is an 
important factor. 
It is understandable that clinicians are reluctant to treat clients they feel 
powerless to help. However, the most serious result of assumptions such as 
these, is a therapeutic nihilism that extends into the future as well as 
complicates the past. Without adequate treatment trials for personality 
disorder or research into the nature of the difficulties involved in such 
treatment, these patients have been deemed untreatable, and the negative 
attitudes towards such patients have been allowed to perpetuate. Until 
recently, this has resulted in the neglect of personality disordered patients as 
well as those who display tendencies toward such diagnoses. Outcome 
research measuring personality disorders has generally focused on their 
influence on the treatment of Axis I disorders, rather than the treatment of 
personality disorders per se (Reich & Green, 1991). 
There is no doubt that those with personality pathology are difficult to treat, 
nor is there any use denying that such individuals have "a peculiar capacity to 
'get under the skin' of and distress others" (Perry & Vaillant, 1989, p. 1352). 
Clinicians and researchers are not immune to the frustration and despair that 
surrounds such patients, this much is obvious. What is not so obvious is the 
more subtle features of neglect that these feelings evoke in the most 
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conscientious clinician. These problems do not excuse us from the task of 
investigating why it is that these patients are so difficult to treat and what can 
be done to improve treatment options. 
A recently published study, however, indicates that some attempts are being 
made to do treatment outcome studies in the area of personality disorder 
(Stevenson & Meares, 1992). Using DSM-III diagnoses, objective outcome 
measures, and a prospective design, these researchers were able to 
demonstrate that a well-defined outpatient psychotherapy resulted in 
statistically significant improvements in patients with borderline personality 
disorder at the end of treatment and at one year follow-up. While the results 
of this study should be considered preliminary, given the lack of a control 
group and the fact that 70% of their subjects retained their diagnosis at follow-
up, it demonstrates that improvements following treatment do exist and can 
be measured objectively. 
5. LACK OF THEORETICAL BASE: 
Many of the problems already mentioned are related to the descriptive nature 
of the current classification of personality disorders. As Kendell (1988) has 
stated, the personality disorders remain, "a jumble of overlapping clinical 
concepts unrelated to theories of personality development or to the 
dimensions of personality identified in normal populations" (p. 1302). The 
committees who devised the DSM-III and DSM-III-R make no apologies for 
the fact that theoretical hypotheses were omitted. In fact, they had 
deliberately set out to avoid using constructs identifiable as belonging to a 
particular theory in order to make the manual acceptable to as large a group of 
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clinicians and researchers as possible. 
This rejection of theory in the new classification appears to have its roots in the 
rejection of psychoanalytic theory as untestable and unscientific. From this, an 
impression was formed that theory is narrowly conceived, controversial and 
therefore detrimental to the acceptance of a classification system. As Carson 
(1991) states, however, this assumption ignores several important factors. 
Clearly, some theories are better than others and to reject all theory on the 
basis of bad experience with one seems foolish. In addition, it is difficult for 
such a classification system to avoid making theoretical assumptions. Morey 
(1991) highlights the results of recent research in cognitive psychology which 
demonstrates that humans organise concepts by using theories about the 
world, rather than on the basis of superficial similarities. Classification 
systems that reject theory, therefore, run the risk of conceptual confusion. 
An example of the kind of conceptual confusion that can result is found in the 
definition of personality disorder in the DSM-III-R, which includes the words 
'chronic' and 'pervasive'. Despite the emphasis on operational definitions in 
the DSM-III and DSM-III-R, however, there is no explanation as to what these 
words mean (Tyrer, 1988). This lack of clarity has had important implications 
for the distinction between Axis I and Axis II disorders. Schizotypal 
personality disorder was once labelled simple schizophrenia. Due to its 
chronicity and pervasiveness along with the absence of clear psychotic 
features it was moved to the personality disorders section. Cyclothymia, in 
contrast, was once considered a personality disorder for similar reasons, but is 
now placed with the affective disorders. Such contradictions result from the 
lack of a clear theoretical base identifying the core constructs of the personality 
disorders that distinguish them from other disorders. 
One of the most important assets of a theoretical base, however, is its 
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explanatory potential. A theory based classification of personality disorders 
would emphasise common causal principles that can also predict important 
associations, such as response to treatment and interaction with other 
disorders. Such information provides a useful guide for both researchers and 
clinicians, enabling insights that may not otherwise be recognised (Millon, 
1991). In addition, a theory need not be restricted to one particular approach 
or perspective. The value of interaction between different fields of research is 
being acknowledged as critical in the development of new scientific 
paradigms (Holzman, 1985). In a similar way, theories of personality disorder 
would benefit from the integration of research from a wide range of fields 
other than psychiatry, such as personality psychology, learning theory, 
genetics, and psychopharmacology. 
Epstein (1987) has added a caveat to this recent enthusiasm for a theoretically 
based classification system. He states, "where adequate theory is available, it 
provides the most desirable basis for diagnosis. However, adequate theory is 
often not available, and an empirical approach is clearly preferable to one that 
is based on poor theory" (Epstein, 1987, p. 108). There is no doubt that there 
has been a historical lack of testable causal theories of personality disorders. 
This does not, however, exclude it as a goal for the future. 
This thesis argues that personality information is an essential component of 
our understanding of patients in the field of psychopathology. For many 
years such information has been neglected due to the problematic nature of 
the concept, and the difficulties surrounding the description, measurement 
and treatment of personality disorders. In order to overcome these difficulties, 
clear and integrated theoretical work is needed from which we can begin to 
answer these questions. To manage this successfully, theoretical hypotheses 
need to incorporate past research findings in the area and provide 
opportunities for further research. A recently proposed personality theory has 
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attempted to achieve this, and it will be the focus of discussion throughout this 
thesis. It is by no means the only adequate and interesting theory available, 
but it is an innovative and integrative approach that has attracted the attention 
of researchers from many different fields. For these reasons it is a useful base 
from which to discuss the role of personality in psychopathology. 
CHAPTER2 




Diagnostic models are thought to shape the direction of theory, research, and 
treatment in psychopathology (Strauss, 1973). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that one of the most prominent debates in the classification of 
psychopathology currently centres around the choice of a structural model 
most suitable for this task (Frances, 1982; Gorton & Akhtar, 1990; Gunderson, 
Links, & Reich, 1991; Livesley, 1985; Robins & Helzer, 1986; Widiger & Kelso, 
1983; Widiger & Trull, 1991). The DSM-III-R, which is the most commonly 
used system at the present time, follows the traditional medical model and 
uses a categorical system. In medical disorders, syndromes are classified 
largely by causal properties. In psychopathology, however, our knowledge of 
causality is limited and what we do know suggests multiple causal agents 
rather than single ones. 
The lack of causal hypotheses is one of several problems that have led to the 
gradual erosion of the categorical model in psychopathology. Polythetic 
criteria have replaced monothetic in the DSM-III-R, severity ratings have been 
included, and some categories are seen to be more "fuzzy" or prototypal than 
distinct. All these changes indicate a trend toward the gradual demise of 
distinct categorical boundaries (Widiger & Trull, 1991). In addition to these 
changes, there has been a growing acceptance of dimensional perspectives, 
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particularly in the area of personality disorders. Although the dimensional-
categorical debate has been most prominent in this area, dimensional 
perspectives are also being developed in childhood, psychotic, dissociative, 
substance use, anxiety, and mood disorders (Widiger & Trull, 1991). 
While some still assume that the current system provides an accurate 
framework and that correction of the details is all that is required, the majority 
of researchers have no illusions that current efforts in this area are to be the 
final word. The DSM-III-R is instead considered to be an appropriate tool by 
which to gather information so that it may be replaced with newer, more 
effective classificatory systems in the future (Carson, 1991; Frances, First, 
Widiger, Miele, Tilly, Davis, & Pincus, 1991). 
This chapter discusses several of the major issues concerning the classification 
of psychopathology, using the personality disorders as a focus wherever 
possible. After a brief historical introduction to the area, the rationale for 
using a classification system in psychopathology is discussed. In order to 
clarify the underlying assumptions of different classificatory systems, three 
methods of construction are examined, before reviewing the recent debate 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the categorical and 
dimensional models of classification. Finally, models that attempt to combine 
the benefits of the two systems are discussed, with special reference to the 
temperament-character model of personality. 
1.2 HISTORY OF PERSONALITY CLASSIFICATION: 
Attempts to classify personality can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. The 
philosopher Empedocles declared that all substances were composed of the 
universe's four basic elements; earth, water, fire, and air; and in doing so 
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demonstrated an early desire to look beyond surface appearances to a more 
fundamental structure. Epstein (1987) notes that while these particular 
elements may have been wrong, the notion of basic elements was sound, and 
ultimately resulted in the impressive classificatory system now known as the 
periodic chart. These four basic elements were not restricted to the description 
of physical structures alone, and in the fourth century B.C. Hippocrates related 
them to four bodily humours (yellow bile, black bile, blood, and phlegm). He 
stated that any excess or imbalance in these would result in disease. 
Elaborating on this further, he identified four basic temperaments that were 
related to these bodily humours; the choleric, the melancholic, the sanguine, 
and the phlegmatic; and hence the first recorded system of personality 
classification (Millon, 1981). Not all of the ancients adhered to a personality 
structure based on a set of fundamental elements. Recorded in the writings of 
Aristotle is an attempt to identify personality characteristics according to 
outward appearances, a system that has also been popular throughout history. 
It is clear that the classification of personality and its disorders is neither 
original, nor straight-forward. In spite of this, the desire to explain personality 
and its relation to the world has led many to attempt to find ways of grouping 
them. In a historical summary of the different personality classification 
systems, Millon (1981) lists the early twentieth century theorists who 
conceived of personality in terms of character propositions, temperament 
hypotheses, and psychiatric conceptions; along with more modern 
formulations such as constitutional models, temperament dimensions, 
factorial categories, psychiatric syndromes, psychoanalytic theories and 
character types, the life-style types of Jung and Adler, interpersonal 
orientations, learned coping patterns, and finally, the DSM-III and DSM-III-R 
personality disorders. 
17 
2. THE PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION: 
Classification is an essential component of information processing (Medin, 
1989; Rosch, 1978). Rather than describe the detailed characteristics of each 
object or phenomenon, humans are able to communicate simply by using the 
relevant category label. By classifying phenomena, it is possible not only to 
understand each phenomenon in relation to the group to which it belongs 
(what it is), but also in relation to other differing groups (what it is not). 
Classification allows us to communicate a vast body of knowledge with ease 
and efficiency. 
Clinicians in the area of psychopathology, somewhat controversially, have 
chosen to follow medicine's lead in its choice of classification model, despite 
the paucity of knowledge regarding causality. In medicine, classification 
implies diagnosis. In psychiatry, diagnosis without knowledge of causality 
incites controversy. In his book,The Role Of Diagnosis In Psychiatry, Kendell 
(1975) acknowledges that psychiatric diagnoses have serious shortcomings. 
Attaching a label to a condition can, he says, encourage a false sense of 
understanding at the expense of thorough questioning of alternative 
hypotheses (Kendell, 1975). From the other extreme, diagnoses often seem 
inadequate to explain the complex nature of each patient's situation. Kendell 
cites Menninger who argues that the only proper alternative to diagnosis is a 
unique and detailed formulation of each patient. Kendell argues that while 
this is essential information for an understanding of that patient, it cannot 
replace the concise summary of a diagnosis which enables the clinician to set 
some kind of limits on assessment, treatment and prognosis. 
To demonstrate the value of diagnosis, Kendell (1975) lists aspects of each 
individual that are important regardless of context or illness: 
1. those shared with all humans, 
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2. those shared with some, but not all, and 
3. those which are unique to the individual. 
If classification is to be of any value, he states, the second of these categories is 
the most important, for if the first and last overshadow it, a classification 
system would be of little practical use. For example, if all mental illness was 
assumed to be the same, we would unerringly apply the same treatment to all. 
Similarly, if every mental illness were unique to each individual, there would 
be extreme delays in communication and learning in the field of mental health. 
In this, albeit simplified context, it becomes clear why psychiatric diagnosis is 
so important for communication. Even if a diagnosis gives us little in the way 
of definite answers about aetiology and prognosis, it does provide us with a 
means of exploring these questions further. It is a scientific tool that enhances 
our ability to investigate particular types of phenomena, and therefore our 
progress toward understanding those phenomena. In order to communicate 
effectively we need a common language. Without such a language, 
researchers and clinicians must create definitions of disorders according to 
their own research, ideas, biases, and other influences, inevitably resulting in 
semantic and conceptual confusion. 
The debate concerning the purposes of classification highlights the need for an 
intricate balance between an individual case approach and a parsimonious 
classification system. At each extreme there are difficulties, with either too 
much or too little information. This depends, however, on the purpose for 
which they are used. In many cases it is advantageous to have both kinds of 
information, the classificatory system to match the individual to the world, 
and the idiosyncratic information to match our world knowledge to the 
individual. For the purposes of research and the communication of 
knowledge, however, it is clear that classification is an important and 
convenient shorthand, without which progress would be much slower. 
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3. CONSTRUCTION OF A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: 
3.1 METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION: 
The method of construction used for a classification system is an important 
indicator of the assumptions and validity of that particular system, yet it is an 
area that has been overlooked by many commentators (Schwartz, 1991). As 
Morey (1991) has stated, without an awareness of the assumptions that form 
the basis of classification systems in psychopathology, it is unclear how the 
field can advance. Clinicians and researchers need to be aware of the methods 
by which a classification system is constructed in order to determine the 
suitability of that system to their specific needs. In the past, methods of 
construction have rarely been made explicit. As a result, there has been a lack 
of clarity concerning what these underlying assumptions are and how they 
effect the validity of the classification system in use. 
In an recent article concerning classification in psychopathology, Millon (1991) 
identified three different methods of construction which will be discussed 
here. The first of these focuses on the accumulation of clinical knowledge 
through the efforts of well respected clinicians and scholars, and has for a long 
time been the dominant method in psychiatry. In contrast, the second method 
of classification, that based on statistical testing, has only relatively recently 
been developed in this area. Third, after a period of disfavour, theory based 
classifications have begun to re-emerge, and their merits acknowledged. 
Although each of these methods is presented separately in order of its 
historical relevance, it should be emphasised that they are not mutually 
exclusive. Skinner (1981) has suggested that each be used in the process of 
validating a diagnostic system. In his description of an integrated paradigm 
for the evaluation of psychiatric classifications, he draws on the work of 
Loevinger (1957), who proposed a three stage process of construct validation 
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for psychometric tools. The first stage involves theory formulation, the 
second, internal validation by statistical means and the third, external 
validation to evaluate predictive, descriptive, and clinical validity. 
3.2 CLINICAL DESCRIPTION: 
In the early stages of any classification, observation of repeated similarities is 
essential. In psychopathology, classification systems have for a long time 
relied heavily on the clinical recognition of patterns within patient samples. 
After careful examination of these data, categories are formed that best clarify 
these relationships. This method of construction generally rests on 
phenomenal observations and the largely intuitive conclusions of respected 
leaders, without the use of theoretical or quantitative approaches (Millon, 
1991). The advantage of this approach is that by using observable phenomena 
as a basis of classification, it is unheeded by our lack of knowledge and 
agreement about aetiology in this domain. As Spitzer stated in the DSM-III 
(1980), it is possible to agree on the identification of mental disorders on the 
basis of their clinical symptomatology without agreeing on the aetiological 
basis of the disorder. 
Although the types of measures used have become more sophisticated since 
the early classifications of Kraepelin and Freud, the current method of 
construction is still largely based on the steady accumulation of clinical 
observation and inference, and the consensus of committees. Such a system 
has enormous potential for cultural biases, dependent as it is on the 
experiences of those doing the describing. The most notorious example of this 
is the historical difference between the DSM I and II (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1952, 1968), and the World Health Organisation's equivalent, the 
International Classification of Diseases (World Health Organisation, 1955, 
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1968). In the 1950's, psychiatric patients could be miraculously cured or have 
a sudden change in disorder due to the act of crossing the Atlantic (Kendell, 
1975). 
This method is also criticised for being influenced not only by culture bound 
tradition but also by the political forces involved in the advancement of 
disciplines. It has been suggested that the DSM's are merely products of the 
currently reigning group of nosologists (Schacht, 1985). The DSM-I (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1952) and the DSM-II (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1968) were largely products of the dominant psychoanalytic 
school (Carson, 1991; Millon, 1991), whereas the DSM-III, in contrast, was 
subject to very different influences. For example, Hempel, a philosopher of 
science, in 1965 advocated "a descriptive approach that remains close to 
observable data, values reliability, and operationalises terminology", that in 
retrospect looks very much like a manifesto for the DSM-ill (cited in Schwartz, 
1987, p. 837). Working from a similar view point, a group of researchers at 
Washington University at St. Louis began to emphasise phenomenological 
description by diagnostic category, and published a set of diagnostic criteria 
(Feighner, Robins, & Guze, 1972) that is thought to have set the example for 
DSM-III (Robins & Helzer, 1986). 
The question of politics is invariably invoked when one is dealing with official 
classifications that rely on descriptive methods of construction. Every stage of 
the process, from the selection of a chairman and committee to the final choice 
of criteria for each disorder is governed by a series of decisions that are 
influenced by both personality and position. Millon (1983) suggested after the 
publication of the DSM-III that many of the debates concerning that 
classification had more to do with school allegiance and personal prejudice 
than fact. It is doubtful that such influences can ever be fully eliminated. 
Instead both those constructing and using the system must remain constantly 
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aware of these influences, and their own susceptibility to them. 
3.3 STATISTICALLY DERIVED CLUSTERS: 
The popularity and established nature of the descriptive approach has made it 
difficult for other methods of classification to find acceptance in 
psychopathology. Advances in mathematical techniques, such as factor 
analysis, however, have led to the use of methods that enable researchers to 
see underlying similarities that could otherwise be hidden. Such methods 
have been developed to explore the nature of patient similarities in ways that 
are seen to be more objective than the clinical method. In this type of 
construction, large amounts of information are fed into statistical equations, 
then analysed mathematically to find similarities. 
Millon (1991), cites Andreasen and Grove (1982) who list three advantages of 
the factor-analytic method. First, it enables features characteristic of the 
subjects to define the classification, rather than the clinicians more subjective 
judgement of those characteristics. Second, it is possible to process larger 
amounts of information than human beings are capable of at one time, and 
third, it can combine sets of information in more complex ways. The classic 
example of this kind of empirical process according to Epstein (1987), is the 
construction of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; 
Hathaway & McKinley, 1943). 
The selection criterion for items in the MMPI was their ability to discriminate 
between a diagnostic group and a normal group. Any item that did this, 
regardless of the reason, was included in the scale. As Epstein (1987) states, 
this meant that if an item such as "I like poetry" was endorsed significantly 
more often by schizophrenics than controls, it would be included in the 
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schizophrenia scale. Epstein also suggests that diagnostic tests constructed in 
this way, may be effective at discriminating subjects for reasons that are 
unknown or contrary to those proposed. This, he states, may result in the 
possibility of misinterpretation of causal influences, and a corresponding 
impediment to the understanding of such influences. 
Millon (1991) points out that while these quantitative methods can be put to 
many uses, only a few are relevant to the construction of classification 
systems, and even those are of doubtful relevance when used as the sole 
method of construction. It is unlikely that a group of patients would be 
distinguished by the use of random variables without some bias or clinical 
inference affecting the results. In the example above, it is still necessary to 
have some prior way of distinguishing schizophrenics from controls in order 
to determine whether they like poetry more than controls do. 
These types of problems have been most obvious with personality 
classifications obtained by factor analytical procedures. It has become clear 
that this method is not the objective scientific tool it was once hoped to be, as 
the quality of information put into such analyses inevitably determines the 
quality of output. Despite the sophistication of the mathematical method, 
subjective and sometimes arbitrary decisions determine the choice of items, 
factor-analytic procedures and rotations, and the ultimate labelling of the 
obtained factors (McAdams, 1992). In this way important constructs may be 
missed, but less central constructs may also be verified, in a kind of factor-
analytical halo effect. 
Millon (1991) cites a comment Kendell made in 1975 as being no less relevant 
to investigators today who have had, "a naive, almost Baconian, attitude to the 
statistical techniques they were employing, putting in all the data at their 
disposal on the assumption that the computer would sort out all the relevant 
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from the irrelevant and expose the underlying principles and regularities, and 
assuming all that was required of them was to collect the data assiduously 
beforehand" (cited in Millon, 1991, p.118). 
3.4 THEORETICALLY DEDUCED CONSTRUCTS; 
Despite the usefulness of clinical description and mathematical techniques in 
the classification of psychopathological disorders, it is clear that they need to 
be integrated into a coherent framework. Cognitive psychologists have 
demonstrated that without theories to interrelate concepts and structure 
attributes, these concepts cannot be organised coherently (Murphy & Medin, 
1985). After a period of criticism of theoretically based methods of 
classification, resulting from the unfalsifiable psychoanalytic theories of 
previous classifications, many writers are beginning to acknowledge the 
importance of theory in the construction of classification systems (Carson, 
1991; Millon, 1991; Morey, 1991; Skinner, 1981). 
The advantages of a theory based classification rest largely with its 
explanatory potential. As Millon (1991) has stated, "theory provides the glue 
that holds a classification together and gives it both its scientific and clinical 
relevance" (p. 257). It provides clinicians and researchers with a guide to 
understanding certain phenomena and encourages the generation of new 
insights about those phenomena. Theories enable the integration of disparate 
concepts into a unified pattern of relations. In addition, theory based 
classification systems provide the means by which to assess the relevance of a 
system and discriminate between alternative systems. 
Theories are also important in their capacity for eliciting predictions and 
providing direction for further investigation. It has been suggested that for 
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this purpose theories need be neither fully comprehensive nor extensively 
supported to be useful (Millon, 1991). Morey (1991) suggests that it is foolish 
to expect too much from a theory, and that we should be investigating specific 
theories about specific phenomena, rather than searching for a universal all 
encompassing theory of psychopathology. It is the role of theory to stimulate 
and guide further investigation that is most important. In order to fulfil these 
criteria, however, he states that a good theory should have a formally 
developed structure that is linked to observables, and can be adequately 
measured and therefore tested (Morey, 1991). Without these qualities the 
advantages of a theoretical base are lost and further research is often 
meaningless. 
4. THE CATEGORICAL MODEL: 
4.1 OVERVIEW: 
Also known as the typological or classical model of classification, the 
categorical model is characterised by "mutually exclusive categories defined 
by a set of necessary and sufficient features" (Livesley, 1985, p. 353). All 
members in each category are assumed to be the same with clear boundaries 
between the different categories. Although quantitative differences are 
acknowledged, boundaries are always distinct and qualitative. 
The most obvious advantages of the categorical model are its simplicity and 
familiarity. Large amounts of information can be communicated in a vivid 
and efficient way, thereby reducing information overload. The categorical 
model has a long history in medical and psychiatric classification systems and 
is consistent with both biological and psychodynamic paradigms (Gunderson 
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et al., 1991). It has been stated that psychiatrists naturally think in categories 
(Frances, 1980), and that psychologists, who ostensibly prefer dimensions, 
convert this information into categories anyway (Widiger & Trull, 1991). In 
addition, the categorical model has an ease of conceptualisation that enables 
disorders to be easily distinguished from one another (Widiger, 1983). In this 
way it is said to stimulate research to clarify these boundaries further so that 
we may concentrate our knowledge and better treat individual disorders. 
4.2 DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CATEGORICAL MODEL: 
(a) Inflexibility: 
In an ideal categorical classification then, categories are homogeneous, 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. As several writers have discovered, 
however, in reality such classes are rarely found even in the seemingly more 
ordered parts of nature, such as the plant kingdom (Frances, 1982; Widiger & 
Kelso, 1983). In psychopathology, the categorical model encourages the 
assumption that disorders are discrete illnesses with qualitative and distinct 
boundaries. It implies that specific categories have specific treatments and 
responses, even though we may not have found them yet. These assumptions 
are increasingly being seen to be Procrustean and inappropriate to the 
complexity of psychopathological phenomena, especially in the area of 
personality pathology (Widiger & Kelso, 1983). 
Another potential problem with the categorical model is that it reflects a more 
definitive consensus than actually exists (Strauss, 1975). Some suggest that it 
contributes to a professional sense of identity by defining a domain of 
expertise (Widiger & Trull, 1991), but it can also lead to "halo effects", by 
which an individual's similarities to the category are exaggerated and 
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inconsistencies ignored. Inadequate description like this can be misleading, 
and ultimately work to the detriment of the patient. 
(b) Classification dilemmas; 
Widiger and Trull (1991) make the point that the placement of what are very 
diverse disorders into distinct categories creates substantial organisational 
problems and classification dilemmas which can lead to diagnostic 
inconsistencies. "Wastebasket" diagnoses such as the "not otherwise 
specified" options are required to cover those individuals who do not fit the 
categories available. Boundary diagnoses such as schizoaffective disorder are 
needed for those who do not fit either one category or another, but include 
components of both. There is also the problem of overlap that necessitates 
multiple diagnoses, most notably in the personality disorders but also in other 
areas such as depression and anxiety. Related to this is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between what are true comorbid phenomena and what is 
merely overlap due to the vagaries of the diagnostic system. 
(c) Arbitrary cut off points: 
To define a category, cut off points are required to determine the difference 
between those who belong and those who do not, in this case to distinguish 
between disorder and normality. In the present classification system, the cut 
off points and frequency criteria have been severely criticised. There is little 
empirical or practical support for those currently being used, making them 
seem somewhat arbitrary (Robins & Helzer, 1986). Fixed cut off points are 
thought to be inappropriate for the many different settings and purposes in 
which the DSM system is used. Widiger and Trull (1991) suggest that 
different cut off points would be optimal for different base rates and 
validators. In addition, there is the problem of subthreshold patients who may 
still have significant personality pathology that will affect other diagnosed 
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disorders or make those patients more vulnerable to environmental stress 
(Gorton & Akhtar, 1990; Tyrer, 1988). At present this information is lost, and 
the relative costs of giving the diagnosis or withholding it are unknown (Finn, 
1983). 
(d) Neglect of information about strengths: 
A similar loss of information occurs with the categorical model's emphasis on 
weaknesses and deficits. This is particularly noticeable in the area of 
personality where strengths may compensate for or even outweigh such 
weaknesses. This information is essential when gauging patient resources for 
treatment planning, yet is often neglected and sometimes ignored when a 
categorical classification system is used. For all of the above reasons the 
categorical nature of the current personality classification is now seen by many 
to be somewhat arbitrary in its distinctions between normal personality and 
the pathological, between personality and other disorders, and between the 
different personality disorders themselves (Widiger, Frances, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 1988). 
5. THE DIMENSIONAL MODEL: 
5.1 OVERVIEW: 
Conceptually, the dimensional model is more complex than the categorical. It 
acknowledges the diversity and uniqueness of individuals, and hence the 
corresponding descriptive complexity that this entails (Strauss, 1973). 
Psychopathology is portrayed by this model as a matter of degree, rather than 
in terms of presence or absence, thus establishing a continuum between 
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disorder and normality (Widiger & Frances, 1985b). This inevitably means 
that boundaries are less distinct and overlap is an integral part of the model 
(Gunderson et al., 1991). 
(a) Comprehensiveness: 
One of the main advantages of the dimensional model of classification is that 
by using dimensional profiles it is able to communicate more specific and 
comprehensive information than is possible with a categorical system 
(Widiger & Kelso, 1983). Subthreshold conditions that may be important 
diagnostically can still be measured by this system, hence improving our 
description, and therefore our knowledge of those patients on the boundaries 
of normality and disorder. In addition, strengths can be acknowledged for 
their influence on the patient's presentation and usefulness in treatment. 
(b) Measurement advantages; 
For research purposes the dimensional model enables quantitative 
measurement of disorders rather than the more qualitative presence or 
absence found in the categorical model. For this reason description by 
dimensions is said to be more reliable and precise. In addition, complex data 
can be manipulated more effectively when quantified on several dimensions. 
For example, if a patient with major depression has subthreshold levels of 
anxiety disorder and personality disorder, the significance of each on a 
dimensional profile may be ascertained. Later, the effect of successful 
treatment for depression can be measured against the other subthreshold 
entities. A dimensional model allows examination of the relative importance 
of different entities in a more precise way than is possible with a categorical 
system. 
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(c) Increased complexity: 
While the dimensional system provides more precise information, this is not 
without a corresponding lack of clarity. Frances (1982) demonstrates this by 
using our descriptions of colours as an example. Although dimensional 
description of colours using wavelength provides more precise and detailed 
information, it is not as vivid or simple as the categorical description of red. 
Frances states that other possible disadvantages of using a dimensional system 
are that underlying discontinuous categories may be concealed and simple 
relationships lost. 
Related to these problems is the argument that dimensional classification is 
too cumbersome for everyday use (Gorton & Akhtar, 1990; Livesley, 1985). 
This is undoubtedly a disadvantage if it results in the system being ignored, 
but as knowledge progresses, any classification system is bound to increase in 
complexity. It is also possible to convert dimensional data into categories 
simply by placing cut-off points on the dimensions, if summary information is 
required (Grove & Tellegen, 1991; Robins & Helzer, 1986; Widiger & Kelso, 
1983). The important difference between this and a categorical system is that 
these points would be flexible, allowing different cut-off points for different 
purposes, and hence avoiding the arbitrariness of those that are fixed (Tyrer, 
1988; Widiger & Trull, 1991). 
5.2 ACCEPTANCE OF THE DIMENSIONAL SYSTEM IN 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: 
There has been a growing acceptance of the dimensional model due to 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of the categorical model, and an increasing 
awareness of the advantages provided by the dimensional approach. Despite 
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this, the dimensional model has never been accepted in an official psychiatric 
classification system (Millon, 1991). When the DSM-III-R was published in 
1987, many were disappointed that an attempt had not been made to 
incorporate a dimensional structure into the personality disorders section. 
With the separation of personality disorders from the other major mental 
disorders, this section of the classification was seen as the perfect arena for 
testing the merits of a dimensional system. The Advisory Committee had 
considered the inclusion of a dimensional classification for the personality 
disorders as an appendix to the DSM-III-R, but stated that they were unable to 
find sufficient data on what kind of dimensional criteria could adequately 
define personality pathology (Widiger et al., 1988). 
This lack of consensus over what a dimensional system should incorporate 
becomes a major issue now that the merits of this kind of system are being 
recognised. There is no agreement about what the dimensions should be or 
even how many basic dimensions should be used (Gorton & Akhtar, 1990; 
Livesley, 1985; Millon, 1991; Strauss, 1973). In the area of personality 
disorders, it has been argued that there are no obvious dimensions available 
that are appropriate to a classification system of personality pathology. There 
is, however, an abundance of research into normal personality dimensions. 
Widiger and Kelso (1983) list nine different theorists who have proposed 
dimensional personality structures, but state that this in itself is problematic 
due to the difficulties involved in choosing between them. 
Most of those opposed to the introduction of a dimensional system conclude 
by stating that although this approach has merits, there is not yet enough 
evidence to justify discarding the familiar and -established diagnostic 
categories with an unfamiliar and unestablished dimensional system (Widiger 
et al., 1988). Others warn that changes in classificatory systems that appear to 
be revolutionary tend to be ignored, so that any advantages of a new system 
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would be lost (Frances, 1982). While there are encouraging signs for the 
implementation of a dimensional model, there is still a noticeable reluctance to 
doso. 
The basis of this reluctance appears to rest more with the influence of tradition 
than anything else. As Widiger and Kelso (1983) state, "to argue that one 
should continue using categories because they are the past or current method 
is to appeal only to inertia and tradition and does not really befit an effort to 
improve and advance understanding" (p. 492). It is important to continue to 
work on dimensional models of classification in the expectation of 
implementing such a system in the near future. In the meantime, awareness of 
a dimensional perspective guards against applying a categorical system too 
rigidly (Frances, 1982). 
6. MIXED MODELS: 
According to Frances (1982), it is often overlooked that dimensional and 
categorical approaches to classification are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. If it is possible to combine the two systems, their 
strengths may be maximised and their weaknesses minimised. Skinner (1981) 
proposes that mixed models also have the potential to integrate seemingly 
unrelated theories of psychopathology. Several models integrating categorical 
and dimensional perspectives have been proposed in the literature for the 
personality disorders, but as yet they remain relatively untested. The 
following section describes some of these models. 
One possibility being researched involves arranging personality pathology 
according to a dimension measuring severity of impairment or dysfunction 
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(Gunderson et al., 1991; Kernberg, 1984; Millon, 1981). Gunderson and his 
colleagues have proposed a synthesis model in which some personality types 
are seen as categorical disorders that extend toward the Axis I disorders, while 
others are conceptualised as trait disorders that extend in the opposite 
direction and merge with normality (Gunderson et al., 1991). They argue that 
the severe personality disorders such as the schizoid and paranoid are more 
likely to fit a categorical model with more specific aetiological factors. Less 
severe disorders such as compulsive and dependent, in contrast, are better 
conceptualised according to a dimensional model, merging as they do with 
normal traits. 
A different group of researchers have used a three dimensional structure to 
describe personality function (Torgersen & Alnaes, 1989). By dichotomising 
each of their three personality dimensions and placing them in a hierarchical 
structure they were able to create a diagnostic decision tree. Using this 
decision tree, they state, the diagnosis of single non-overlapping personality 
disorder is possible, rather than multiple overlapping diagnoses. These can be 
related to the currently used personality disorders, as well as providing new 
diagnoses, such as non-oral-obsessive-borderline, which result from 
combinations of the current diagnoses. 
An alternative approach for mixed categorical-dimensional models is to widen 
their perspective to include normality while reserving the extremes on these 
dimensions for categorical diagnoses. Skinner (1981) describes one approach 
by Sneath (1975) who used a vector model to arrange diseases in a 
dimensional space. According to this model, normality is represented by a 
cluster of points surrounding the centre of the dimensional space. As an 
individual becomes ill they move away from this centre; the distance or length 
of the vector determines severity of illness, and the direction indicates the type 
of disease. 
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A recently proposed model of personality has several similarities to the vector 
model. The psychobiological model of temperament and character proposes 
seven dimensions which in combination make up the structure of personality. 
Three of these dimensions are said to be temperament based, and in 
combination can describe different personality structures (Cloninger, 1986, 
1987). Scores on each dimension can be located in a three dimensional space 
giving each individual a point within this space. By adding information about 
character to these temperament dimensions, it is possible to rate the likelihood 
or severity of personality pathology (Svrakic, Whitehead, Pryzbeck, & 
Cloninger, 1992). In this model, severity ratings can be established through 
character dimensions, while a categorical personality diagnosis can be 
obtained through the temperament profile. This theory is based on a 
dimensional model that accounts for categorical diagnoses, has a clear 
theoretical base and provides possibilities for measurement and testing. For 
these reasons it will form the basis of discussion in the following chapters, as 
an example of how we might improve our understanding of the role of 
personality in the area of psychopathology. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Cloninger's Unified Biosocial 
Theory of Personality 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
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In 1986, Cloninger, presented a three dimensional biosocial theory of 
personality. Given the large number of personality theories that had already 
used a tri-dimensional structure, this idea in itself was not new. What caught 
the attention of the scientific community, however, was the depth and breadth 
of information that Cloninger had gathered in support of the theory. During 
the course of his research, he had reviewed information spanning several 
different fields of learning, including "genetics (human, animal, and 
evolutionary studies), psychology (learning theory, cognitive psychology, 
psychophysiology, personality theory), and psychiatry (nosology, 
psychopharmacology, longitudinal research)", in support of what he labelled a 
"unified biosocial theory of personality'' (Cloninger, 1986, p. 210). 
Historically, personality theorists have tended to retain a primary focus on 
either biological determinants of personality, or the role of learning through 
environmental influences. A major goal of the biosocial theory was to draw 
together each of these broad perspectives into a unified format so that their 
roles could be examined in relation to each other, rather than in isolation. 
Cloninger argued that the consideration of biologic variation alone is 
insufficient to explain the vast array of individual differences that form what 
we know as personality. The heritability of personality traits has been 
36 
repeatedly estimated to be between 40 and 60% (Loehlin, 1982), indicating that 
genetics accounts for only half of personality variation. Similarly, the 
contribution of social learning and other environmental factors is insufficient 
to be able to view them as sole causal influences. 
Cloninger (1987) described personality as "individual differences in the 
adaptive systems involved in the reception, processing, and storing of 
information about the environment'' (p. 574). According to the theory, these 
adaptive systems are governed by underlying biologic variation, that is, 
individual differences in the three proposed genetic dimensions of personality. 
While genetic factors influence neurobiological substrates and activity, they 
are in turn affected by the environment, hence modifying the expression of 
those genetic factors (Roy & Linnoila, 1988). In contrast to other theorists who 
assume that the observable phenotypic structure of personality corresponds 
with the genetic variation, Cloninger stressed the need to consider them 
independently. According to this model, the phenotypic structure of 
personality is based on genetic variation, environmental influences, and 
interactions between the two. 
2. CLONINGER'$ THREE DIMENSIONS OF PERSONALITY: 
On the basis of information from family studies, longitudinal development 
studies, psychometric studies of personality structure, as well as 
neuropharmacologic and neuroanatomical studies of behavioural conditioning 
and learning in man and other animals, Cloninger proposed three 
uncorrelated, heritable and stable dimensions of personality. Each dimension 
was thought to follow a normal distribution and show little or no evidence of 
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bimodality or multimodality. These dimensions are novelty seeking, harm 
avoidance, and reward dependence. 
Cloninger hypothesised each of these dimensions to be associated with a 
specific pattern of behaviour in response to a specific type of environmental 
stimuli, and suggested that variation on each dimension is correlated with 
activity in a particular central monoaminergic pathway. In addition, he 
described prototypic personality characteristics of individuals high or low on 
each of the three dimensions, examining the relative influence of extremes on 
each of the three primary dimensions individually. Later, Cloninger 
broadened his analysis to encompass nine personality types based on 
combinations of these extremes which will be discussed later in relation to the 
personality disorders. The focus of this chapter, however, is on the nature of 
these primary dimensions, which are briefly described before their basis is 
presented in more detail in the following sections. 
2.1 NOVELTY SEEKING; 
Novelty seeking (NS), the first of Cloninger's dimensions, is characterised by 
intense responses to novelty, potential reward or potential relief from 
monotony or punishment, that lead to exploratory activity or active avoidance 
and escape (Cloninger, 1987). These novelty seeking traits are said to be 
related to variation in the brain system involved with incentives or 
behavioural activation. Cloninger defined a central role for dopaminergic 
activity in this brain system with low levels of basal firing rates being 
correlated with high NS. A person who is higher than average on NS is 
characterised as impulsive, exploratory, fickle, excitable, quick-tempered, 
extravagant, and disorderly; in contrast to an individual lower than average 
who is described as reflective, rigid, loyal, stoic, frugal and persistent. 
38 
2.2 HARM A VOID AN CE: 
The second dimension, harm avoidance (HA), is characterised by a heritable 
tendency to respond intensely to aversive stimuli such as conditioned signals 
for punishment, novelty, and frustrative nonreward. Such stimuli lead to 
behavioural inhibition in the form of passive avoidance and extinction 
(Cloninger, 1987). Cloninger proposed that the principle monoamine 
neuromodulator involved in this behavioural inhibition system is serotonin, 
with high basal serotonergic activity corresponding closely to high HA. 
Individuals who are higher than average in HA are described as cautious, 
tense, apprehensive, fearful, inhibited, shy, and easily fatigued. Those who 
are low on this dimension appear to be confident, relaxed, optimistic, carefree, 
uninhibited, outgoing, and energetic. 
2.3 REWARD DEPENDENCE: 
The final dimension, labelled reward dependence (RD), is hypothesised to be a 
heritable tendency to respond intensely to stimuli that represent reward or 
relief from punishment (Cloninger, 1987). This may occur to the extent that a 
resistance to extinction of the rewarded behaviour occurs. It is proposed that 
this behavioural maintenance system is closely related to noradrenergic 
activity in the brain, with high basal levels of noradrenaline associated with 
high RD. Those higher than average on RD are described as persistent, 
industrious, warmly sympathetic, sentimental, sensitive to social cues and 
personal succour. Those low on RD, in contrast, appear to be socially 
detached, emotionally cool, practical, tough minded, emotionally 
independent, and respond largely to practical rewards rather than social ones. 
39 
3. ORIGINS OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS: 
3.1 SIMILARITIES WITH OTHER PERSONALITY THEORIES: 
Personality theory has been through several distinct historical phases in recent 
times (Millon, 1984). In the first part of the century, it was dominated by the 
clinical portrayals of theorists such as Freud, Horney, and Sullivan. To these 
writers personality was a complex but integrated system that required equally 
complex explanations. During the 1950's and 1960's, however, a very different 
perspective on personality emerged to challenge this tradition. Theories like 
Freud's were seen to be grandiose and speculative and were condemned for 
their lack of testable constructs. The new generation of personality theorists 
placed an emphasis on observable and hence falsifiable behavioural 
representations of personality structure. Psychometric tools such as factor 
analysis were used to determine the number and nature of personality 
dimensions. This method too was eventually criticised for its inability to 
determine causal structures in personality. It seemed that in the reaction 
against untestable theories, researchers had gone to the other extreme by 
proposing testable but often meaningless factors. 
During his research on personality traits in individuals without 
psychopathology, Cloninger noted that many theorists had proposed three 
independent dimensions of personality variation (Cloninger, 1987). Three 
dimensional models presented a common theme in a literature complicated by 
hundreds of different personality concepts, theories, labels and types. While 
the details varied between Cloninger and other personality theorists 
postulating a three dimensional structure, many of the models bore 
descriptive similarities to his three dimensions. 
For example, in Sheldon's descriptions of personality based on body type (as 
described in Millon, 1981), it is possible to find similarities to Cloninger's three 
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dimensions. Sheldon's mesomorph, who is assertive, high on physical energy, 
and has a need for power when troubled, could easily be characterised as a 
high novelty seeker. In addition, the endomorph, who easily expresses 
emotion, has a love of comfort, and depends on social approval would score 
highly on reward dependence. Faced with other similarities, it appeared to 
Cloninger that researchers from varying theoretical perspectives had been 
tapping into the same personality substrates. Cloninger (1987) concluded, 
"the similarities in the descriptions of human motivation and personality ... 
suggest some fundamental validity to inferences drawn from widely different 
perspectives" (p. 503). 
What Cloninger saw as the main difference between his approach and that of 
his predecessors was his use of 'extrastatistical' information to derive the three 
dimensions of NS, HA, and RD. By postulating a theoretical framework for 
his three dimensions which could be tested in several different ways, 
Cloninger was able to combine the advantages of both these historical trends 
and minimise their shortcomings. He also argued that such a framework 
enabled clinicians and researchers to discriminate between various 
conceptualisations in an attempt to find which is most useful. Untestable 
theories and those based on purely descriptive organisations of personality 
structure, in contrast, provided no means by which to do this, hence resulting 
in the endless alternatives proposed throughout history. 
3.2 GENETIC RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY: 
Genetic research has provided many useful answers in the study of disease 
and illness. In regard to human behaviour, however, it is only just beginning 
to be recognised as a significant contributor, the most obvious example being 
research on the genetic heritability of aggressiveness (Elliot, 1986). For 
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personality traits measured by questionnaires, it has been consistently 
demonstrated that heritability is between 40-60% (Loehlin, 1982). In addition, 
although approximately 50% of personality variation is environmentally 
influenced, much of this variation has been found to be the result of non-
shared, non-familial factors. This indicates that while personality structure is 
partly influenced by stable genetic factors, the environmental component of 
the equation relies almost solely on individual experiences rather than familial 
environmental factors, making research even more problematic (Plomin & 
Daniels, 1987). Given these consistent findings in the personality literature, 
Cloninger proposed genetic influences as a key factor in his theory. 
McGuffin and Thapar (1992), in their review of the genetics of personality 
disorder, highlight three methods by which to investigate the influence of 
genetics on personality. While each has shortcomings, together they provide 
evidence of the genetic transmission of personality. The first uses animal 
models of temperament in order to make hypotheses about the genetic 
transmission of personality traits in humans. It has long been observed in 
animals that certain strains can be bred for their temperamental attributes. 
The relation of these studies to humans, however, is fraught with difficulties. 
Animal studies are only indirectly related to humans, because the behaviour 
observed is much simpler and more limited than human behaviour. In 
addition, many believe that personality consists of more than observable 
behaviour, making relations between studies of animals and humans difficult 
to assume. 
A second source of information regarding the relation of genetics to 
personality comes from psychophysiological measures, such as 
electroencephalographic patterns and galvanic skin response, in which 
personality variables are thought to be reflected. However, given the relative 
crudity of such measures and their complex relation to personality, these 
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measures are often thought to be an oversimplification of complex relations. 
The third method of investigating genetic influences on personality, and the 
most common, involves the collection of personality measures in relatives 
reared together and those reared apart. These data are most useful when they 
have come from pairs of monozygotic and dizygotic twins. There is an 
overwhelming consensus in this literature that a genetic component of 
personality exists. As McGuffin and Thapar (1992) state, however, there is still 
some controversy as to whether this genetic contribution is modest but 
significant for all traits, or whether there is a differential heritability of certain 
aspects of personality. 
Cloninger has presented material from neurobiological and family studies in 
support of the heritability of his three dimensions (Cloninger, 1986, 1987). 
Much of this material has not been directly tested with his three dimensions, 
however, and he has relied on approximations of other peoples work to his 
own, such as Gray and Eysenck. For example, Cloninger (1986) cites a twin 
study of extroversion by Eaves and Eysenck in which they discovered that 
both genetic and environmental factors contributed to the variability of this 
dimension. In this study the subscales of impulsivity and sociability were 
found to be genetically independent. While the social and environmental 
antecedents were correlated. Cloninger stated that the impulsivity scale 
included items related to both NS and HA which would account for the 
genetic overlap with sociability (low HA). He concluded, ''This supports the 
hypothesis presented here that HA and NS are genetically independent but 
that negative feedback interaction will lead to a single phenotypic factor 
because of the reciprocal effects of environmental stimuli" (Cloninger, 1986, p. 
178). 
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3.3 GENOTYPIC VS. PHENOTYPIC VARIATION: 
The previous example highlights the importance of separating genotypes 
(genetic substrates) from phenotypes (genetic framework as modified by 
environmental influences). Cloninger emphasised that although his 
personalty dimensions were hypothesised to be genetically independent, they 
were also seen to influence each other when interacting with the environment. 
For example, he stated that harm avoidance had a modulating influence on 
both NS and RD (Cloninger, 1987). An individual high on RD would respond 
to frustrative nonreward with continued reward-seeking. If that same 
individual was also high on HA, however, the same stimulus should lead to 
extinction of the behaviour. In such a case, Cloninger stated, the resulting 
behaviour is based on the balance of the two influences. Therefore, although 
genetic variation is independent, the structure of observed behaviour may 
differ according to environmental influences and the interaction of the three 
dimensions. 
Cloninger (1986) contrasted his theory with others who have proposed genetic 
substrates of personality, such as Eysenck and Gray, stating that they have 
"implicitly assumed that the observed phenotypic structure of personality 
corresponds with the underlying biogenetic variation" (p. 215). As an 
example of this, he compares his dimensions with that of Eysenck who also 
had as his goal the integration of biological and environmental influences into 
a scientifically testable format. According to Cloninger, neuroticism has high 
HA as its major influence, with lesser positive contributions of NS and RD. 
Extroversion has high RD as its major determinant with various combinations 
of NS and HA resulting in different subscale scores. Finally, he states, 
psychoticism depends mainly on high NS, while the contribution of HA and 
RD varies. 
44 
He attributed these combinations to the possibility that Eysenck's dimensions 
are measuring phenotypic variation and stated that this can also account for 
the research evidence which demonstrates that they do not correspond well 
with underlying genetic variation (Cloninger, 1986). Another example of this 
phenotypic variation is Zuckerman's trait dimension of sensation seeking, 
which Zuckerman sees as synonymous with NS (Zuckerman, 1988). Cloninger 
disputes this claim, however, stating that it has no simple relationship to any 
of his dimensions, appearing instead to be a synthesis of high NS, low HA, 
and possibly low RD (Cloninger, 1988b). 
Cloninger went on to present neurochemical evidence relating to the 
mechanisms of these heritable dimensions which he proposed influenced the 
phenotypic structure of personality. The following sections will describe the 
research that Cloninger used to hypothesise connections between NS, HA, and 
RD, and the monoamine pathways of dopamine, serotonin, and noradrenaline. 
4. BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE: 
4.1 BEHAVIOURAL ACTIVATION (NS) AND DOPAMINE: 
The concept of NS rests on the assumption of a behavioural activation system 
in the brain which "requires both sensorimotor integration and direction of 
behaviour toward novel or pleasurable stimuli" (Cloninger, 1987, p. 575). 
Cloninger postulated that this system is associated with dopaminergic activity 
so that high levels of NS are indicative of low basal dopaminergic activity. In 
his summary of the evidence to suggest such a connection, Cloninger 
described the neural pathways involved. Dopaminergic cell bodies in the 
ventral tegmentum have ascending projections to the striatum, the nucleus 
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accumbens, the frontal and limbic cortex. Cloninger stated that the 
behavioural activation system has its final neural pathway via dopaminergic 
cells in the midbrain which project to the forebrain. 
Cloninger cited several studies which have shown self stimulation at the sites 
of dopaminergic neurons in animals to be accompanied by increased activity 
and positive reinforcement of the eliciting behaviour. In humans such 
stimulation has lead to feelings of subjective pleasure and satisfaction. 
Dopamine depleting lesions in the nucleus accumbens and the ventral 
tegmentum of animals have resulted in neglect of novel stimuli and a 
reduction in spontaneous activity and investigative behaviour, while partial 
lesions have been shown to lead to hyperactivity. 
Further support for the role of dopamine in behavioural activation, Cloninger 
stated, is provided by studies of agonists such as amphetamines, cocaine, 
alcohol arid opiates which facilitate dopamine transmission. Such agonists 
lead to behavioural activation, whereas dopamine antagonists such as 
haloperidol result in anhedonia, reduced exploratory behaviour, and a 
reduced response to positive reinforcement. In his 1986 article, Cloninger 
described how individuals with impulsivity and somatic anxiety, when 
treated with dopamine agonists improve, but when treated with 
benzodiazepines, barbiturates or alcohol show no change and in some cases 
deterioration. 
In his summary of the research on neurochemical influences on behaviour, 
Mulder, (in press) stated that low dopamine activity has been associated with 
suicidal behaviour, undersocialised conduct disorder, impulsive and antisocial 
behaviour. He concluded that dopamine clearly has an activating and 
incentive function in animals, and that it is possible that low levels in humans 
will also increase behavioural activation. 
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This evidence has two noticeable limitations for Cloninger's theory, however. 
First, although it appears clear that dopamine is in some way involved in 
behavioural activation, it is not clear in what direction this manifests itself. In 
the examples cited above, dopamine agonists are said to facilitate the 
transmission of dopamine and enhance behavioural activation. Yet according 
to Cloninger, low levels of dopamine are thought to increase behavioural 
activation. If these studies have been correctly cited it would seem 
problematic to state that low levels of dopamine activate behaviour. A safer 
hypothesis would be that while dopamine is centrally involved in the 
behavioural activation system, the complexity of that involvement is not yet 
understood. 
Second, the studies cited are predominantly concerned with behavioural 
activation per se, rather than the more specific behaviour of novelty seeking. 
For example, an animal increasing its locomotor activity and a human 
experiencing pleasure and satisfaction in response to stimulation of dopamine 
sites in their brains, do not equate to novelty seeking even though they may be 
related. In addition, the description of drug effects can be distorted to fit post 
hoc hypotheses. For example, is a rat injected with haloperidol not able to 
seek novelty because its locomotor activity is affected, or because its ability to 
novelty seek is disrupted? The more parsimonious explanation for this is the 
first. 
4.2 BEHAVIOURAL INHIBITION (HA) AND SEROTONIN: 
In the same article, Cloninger (1986) postulated that high HA is indicative of 
activity in the behavioural inhibition system which he believed to be 
associated with high basal serotonergic activity in the brain. Serotonergic 
projections are thought to inhibit dopamine neurons, Cloninger stated, and are 
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essential for conditioned inhibition of activity by signals of punishment and 
non-reward. The brain areas involved in this system include ascending 
serotonergic projections from the raphe nuclei to the limbic system and the 
prefrontal cortex, as well as cholinergic projections from the ventral tegmental 
area and basal nucleus of Meynert to the frontal neocortex. Cloninger cited 
Gray who considers the septohippocampal area of the limbic system to be 
especially important in behavioural inhibition, describing it as a comparator 
which checks predicted against actual events and interrupts behaviour when 
the unexpected occurs. 
The role of serotonin in suicidal and aggressive behaviour was highlighted in 
a recent review of serotonin in personality disorder (Coccaro, Astill, & Szeeley, 
1990). These authors report that in animal studies it has been demonstrated 
that decreased serotonergic activity is associated with increased aggression, 
while in humans it has been associated with violent suicide, past suicide 
attempts, and impulsive and aggressive behaviour. They report that careful 
examination of the animal studies show that it is stimulus-linked aggression 
rather than generalised aggression that is linked to low serotonergic function. 
In one human study in which all subjects had a history of aggression, 
however, it was found that low CSF 5-HIAA (5-hydroxy-indoleacetic acid, a 
metabolite of serotonin) is associated with a history of impulsive rather than 
planned aggression. 
Coccaro et al. (1990) have reviewed the literature that examines the role of 
serotonin in the treatment of impulsive aggression. They found that while 
lithium, antidepressants, neuroleptics, carbamazepine and beta-blockers have 
all been partially successful in reducing aggression in patients, it is still not 
clear whether this is due to serotonergic influences or other neurochemical 
systems. Fluoxetine, a specific serotonin reuptake inhibitor, has been shown 
to decrease aggression in animals, and preliminary data from the treatment of 
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three patients with personality disorder has found a clear decrease in overt 
aggressive behaviour. These results led the authors to conclude that "central 
serotonin function appears to regulate suicidal and impulsive aggressive 
behaviours in an inverse fashion" (Coccaro et al., 1990, p. 591). 
Mulder (in press) also summarised this research stating that low levels of 5-
HIAA have been linked with suicide, violent suicide, violent disinhibited 
behaviour, impulsivity, and arson. In contrast high levels have been 
associated with low sociability and schizoid personality in young males. Each 
of these reviews, while remaining aware of the difficulties involved in 
measuring neurotransmitter functioning, provide preliminary support for the 
role of serotonin in behavioural inhibition in accordance with Cloninger's 
theory. 
Once again, however, there is a similar problem as there was with dopamine, 
in that while serotonin appears to be involved with behavioural inhibition, this 
does not necessarily equate with HA. For example, both dopamine and 
serotonin have been shown to be linked with suicidal and impulsive 
behaviour. Cloninger (1986) distinguishes the two sets of data by referring to 
his clinical experience and what appears to be more parsimonious 
explanations. But as Eysenck has stated, relying on clinical experience runs 
the risk of assuming face value to be a scientifically defensible argument, 
where clearly it is not (Eysenck, 1988). 
4.3 BEHAVIOURAL MAINTENANCE (RD) AND NORADRENALINE; 
Cloninger (1986) proposed that behavioural maintenance, the final brain 
system central to his theory, is related to noradrenergic activity, with low basal 
activity associated with high reward dependence. Noradrenergic pathways 
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run from the locus ceruleus in the pons to the hypothalamus, limbic structures 
and the cerebral cortex. While the number of noradrenergic neurons is small 
they are thought to project throughout the brain. 
Cloninger cited learning and conditioning studies which suggest that the 
effects of noradrenergic deficits are specific, despite their diffuse location. 
Studies with rats have shown that long term partial reduction of noradrenaline 
release in the forebrain leads to increased resistance to extinction of previously 
rewarded behaviour as well as improved response to conditioned signals of 
relief of punishment. Human studies of short term reduction of noradrenaline 
release indicate that this selectively impairs paired associate learning, 
particularly the acquisition of novel associations. Cloninger concluded that 
these studies suggest that noradrenaline enhances the establishment of 
conditioned associations in general. 
Roy and Linnoila (1988) reported a study carried out measuring MHPG (a 
metabolite of noradrenaline) in pathological gamblers, which found them to 
have significantly increased levels of centrally produced CSF MHPG than 
controls. They concluded that pathological gamblers may have some kind of 
dysfunction in their reward mechanisms. While this conclusion would concur 
with Cloninger's hypothesised connection of noradrenaline to behavioural 
maintenance, they do not comment on the directionality of this noradrenergic 
influence. According to the theory, it would be expected that pathological 
gamblers would be high on RD, which is theoretically linked to low basal 
activity of noradrenaline, a hypothesis that is not supported by this study. 
Other researchers are not convinced that noradrenaline relates solely to this 
behavioural maintenance system, stating that it has been shown to be 
implicated in a variety of other behaviours (Mulder, in press). It is clear that 
noradrenaline levels are active in circumstances that lead to increased arousal, 
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which in turn increases the likelihood of attention and learning. What is not 
clear, however, is whether this is in response to novel, aversive, rewarding or 
even all stimuli. Because of this, Cloninger's focus on reward stimuli remains 
controversial. 
4.4 PROBLEMS WITH THIS CONCEPTUALISATION: 
With each of the three dimensions there are problems with the hypothesised 
relations to the three neurotransmitters, such as the directionality of the links 
and the validity of using general research findings to support Cloninger's 
more specific labels. In addition, Eysenck (1988) points out that Cloninger has 
not always been accurate in his interpretation of some of the studies cited. For 
example, Eysenck states that Cloninger has discussed the work of two separate 
investigators (Petrie and Buschbaum) without recognising that they use the 
same terminology in very different ways. This oversight has meant that what 
is contradictory information has been presented in a supporting context. 
Given the extensive amount of material cited by Cloninger in his original 
article it is easy (both as writer and reader) to neglect details of the original 
experiments used as evidence for the biosocial theory. As Eysenck (1988) 
points out, however, "a conclusion is only as strong as its weakest support, 
and his failure here must make one suspicious about other parts of the edifice 
which may be equally weak and subject to criticism" (p. 74). 
Much of the immediate comment and criticism of the theory, however, 
focused on Cloninger's use of specific neuromodulators in relation to the three 
dimensions (Mulder, in press; Nurnberger, 1988; Zuckerman, 1988). There 
was concern that without reference to the many other neurochemicals 
involved, Cloninger's use of these neurobiologic correlates of behaviour risked 
oversimplifying their relation to the associated behaviours. While knowledge 
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of neurotransmitter functioning has increased markedly over the last decade, 
this area is still extremely complex and clearly requires much more 
sophisticated models than first believed. Mulder (in press) stated that "it has 
become clear that the concept of an isolated central nervous system transmitter 
controlling a specific neurophysiological function is an oversimplification". 
At present, progress in this area is hampered by the many methodological and 
practical difficulties associated with the study of human monoamine systems. 
These difficulties often relate to problems of measurement, with currently 
available techniques being either indirect or invasive (Mulder, in press). Once 
results are obtained, it is unclear whether they have been influenced by 
unaccounted for variables and as a result become unreliable measures of 
monoamine levels. For example, difficulties determining the interactions 
between the neurotransmitters themselves, as well as other variables, create 
such reliability dilemmas. In addition, there are problems clarifying whether 
the measurement is a stable reflection of levels or a temporary fluctuation due 
to state variables. Mulder (1992) also warns that even if a valid and reliable 
measurement of neurotransmitter activity is obtained, its hypothesised 
relation to a particular behaviour is in turn influenced by the conceptualisation 
and measurement of that behaviour. 
Although knowledge in this area is advancing rapidly, the available methods 
of measurement are still relatively primitive. In attempting to create a 
biosocial model, Cloninger's goal was to integrate this knowledge with other 
areas of information in the most useful and parsimonious way. As 
Nurnberger (1988) states, it is unlikely that Cloninger intended to make the 
assumption that each of his three dimensions equate solely to the chosen 
neuromodulator, as in his discussion of the biochemical substrates of the 
behavioural inhibition system Cloninger discusses the role of GABA and 
dopamine as well as serotonin. By using three relatively well researched 
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neurotransmitters, however, Cloninger has created a heuristic framework 
from which to test his theory and develop further hypotheses. 
5.THE TRIDIMENSIONAL PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE: 
5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE TPQ: 
Without a practical and reliable way to measure the hypothesised dimensions 
of NS, HA, and RD, the concepts remained theoretically interesting, but 
largely descriptive, speculative and difficult to test. Realising this, Cloninger 
developed a method of quantifying behavioural variation on each dimension 
so that his hypotheses could be tested. In 1987, he presented empirical tests he 
had carried out in order to provide such a measurement. He began by 
developing a clinical interview schedule, the Tridimensional Interview of 
Personality Style (TIPS) that included quantitative ratings of seven bipolar 
items for each of the three dimensions. From this, a 100 item self-report 
questionnaire was developed, which he called the Tridimensional Personality 
Questionnaire (TPQ)(Cloninger, 1987). 
In an attempt to quantify behavioural variation on each dimension separately, 
Cloninger chose to use clearly independent items to minimise any interaction. 
In practical terms, he stated, this resulted in the TPQ measuring behaviours 
thought to be characteristic of individuals extreme on one dimension and 
average on the other two. Because the TPQ was developed from a theoretical 
basis (in contrast to earlier studies which relied on factor analysis of self-report 
behaviour) it was intended to reflect the underlying genetic structure of 
personality. Variation along the dimensions of NS, HA, and RD was proposed 
to be normally distributed, with the majority of the population falling within 
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the intermediate ranges on each dimension. 
An 80-item short form of the TPQ was initially administered to a group of 101 
medical students, along with various other measures of personality and 
anxiety. Results of this initial testing showed that the TPQ measures of each 
dimension had adequate internal consistency and short-term test-retest 
reliabilities that were moderate to strong. The dimensions were found to be 
largely uncorrelated and were normally distributed. The weak correlations 
that existed had been predicted; for example, NS had a weak negative 
correlation with HA and there was a weak positive correlation between RD 
and HA. Various tests to evaluate possible response biases showed that these 
were small and in the predicted directions. For example, high NS was 
associated with inconsistency of true responses on Tellegen's 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ), in accordance with the 
expectation that individuals high on NS are distractable, inattentive to details, 
and impulsive. 
A revision of the TPQ, consisting of 100 items with four subscales for each 
dimension, was tested on a United States national area probability sample of 
1,019 adults. The subscales of this version of the TPQ are given in table 1. The 
recently published results provided initial reliability and validity data for the 
instrument (Cloninger, Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1991). In addition, it was noted in 
this study that the TPQ scores were only slightly affected by 
sociodemographic factors and social desirability. 
The RD dimension was shown to be less consistent than NS and HA, however, 
and the authors attributed this to its fewer items, which may have resulted in 
response characteristics that made it difficult to differentiate clearly among 
respondents. Cloninger and his associates conceded that before the validity of 
this dimension can be confirmed, this section of the questionnaire requires 
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further work. Past theories have also had difficulty establishing the validity of 
more than two dimensions of personality (Digman, 1990), and Cloninger's 
problems may reflect the lack of clear knowledge available about additional 
personality dimensions. 
TABLE1 
TPQ SCALES AND SUBSCALES 
Novelty Seeking (NS) 
NSl: exploratory excitability vs. stoic rigidity (9 items) 
NS2: impulsiveness vs. reflection (8 items) 
NS3: extravagance vs. reserve (7 items) 
NS4: disorderliness vs regimentation (10 items) 
Harm Avoidance (HA) 
HAl: anticipatory worry vs. uninhibited optimism 
(10 items) 
HA2: fear of uncertainty vs. confidence (7 items) 
HA3: shyness with strangers vs. gregariousness (7 items) 
HA4: fatigability and asthenia vs. vigour (10 items) 
Reward Dependence (RD) 
RDl: sentimentality vs insensitiveness (5 items) 
RD2: persistence vs. irresoluteness (9 items) 
RD3: attachment vs. detachment (11 items) 
RD4: dependence vs. independence (5 items) 
(Adapted from Cloninger et al., 1991) 
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Cloninger later compared the results of this American survey with a sample of 
274 Yugoslav university students (Svrakic, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1991). 
Overall the results suggested that the TPQ was performing in the way it was 
intended to, and that while the shorter subscales did not have high internal 
consistency the higher order scales were generally sound. The internal 
consistency of the three scales matched that, of earlier samples with HA the 
highest, followed by NS, with RD demonstrating the poorest internal 
consistency. After again finding problems with the RD scale a decision was 
made to expand the TPQ with the hope that the psychometric properties of the 
instrument would improve. 
5.2 INDEPENDENT STUDIES OF THE TPQ: 
To date there have been only a handful of independent investigations of the 
psychometric properties of the TPQ. These studies also suggest that further 
refinement of the instrument is necessary before it can be confidently stated to 
be measuring the theoretical constructs it is intended to measure or that these 
constructs exist. Nixon and Parsons (1989), using an early version of the TPQ 
tested a sample of 225 college students and found that the instrument was a 
valid measure of the theoretical dimensions. They discovered several gender 
differences with females scoring higher on HA and the social sensitivity 
subscale of RD. In addition they found a significant difference of college 
major with engineering students lower than general psychology students on 
NS and social sensitivity. These authors looked only at intercorrelations and 
the relation of the dimensions to gender, academic major and intellectual 
achievement. As a result they did not discover any of the previously 
mentioned statistical problems with the RD scale. 
In a later study, the same investigators tested subjects undergoing treatment 
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for chemical dependency to determine whether the TPQ could distinguish 
between different drug user groups (Nixon & Parsons, 1990). While 
replicating the gender differences found in their earlier study, these 
investigators stated they were unable to demonstrate that the three scales were 
independent, or that they discriminated between drug user groups. They 
concluded that the TPQ must be carefully tested before its use becomes 
widespread. 
Closer examination of their results, however, show that the overall 
correlations between scales was either significant but low (ie. approximately 
0.20), or non significant. While their data for alcoholics did not fit the 
typologies previously hypothesised by Cloninger (1987), they did demonstrate 
that the correlation between RD and HA was not significant and that those for 
NS were around the 0.25 level. HA was shown to be significantly correlated 
with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961), and NS was significantly negatively correlated with age, 
results that are both predictable from the theory. For stimulant and other drug 
abusers the pattern was different, with the only significant correlation between 
NS and HA, a possibility that Cloninger had originally hypothesised. 
While this study provides some contradictory evidence for the biosocial 
theory, it demonstrates that further research is necessary to refine the 
measures and to determine whether the TPQ is suitable for discriminating 
among this population rather than reject the instrument or theory outright. 
An interesting alternative data analysis in this case would have been to divide 
the population according to their dimensional profiles on the TPQ and then 
examine the differences and similarities between groups, rather than look at 
individual dimensions in isolation. 
Another recently published study of 298 university students has highlighted 
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structural problems with the TPQ (Earleywine, Finn, Peterson, & Pihl, 1992). 
These investigators examined the factor structure of the instrument using 
confirmatory factor analysis, as well as examining correlates of the TPQ. 
While they found the three scales to be correlated with other personality 
measures, providing evidence for the convergent validity of the instrument, 
they failed to replicate its three-factor structure. However, although this three-
factor structure could not be replicated, no other model examined provided a 
significant improvement. These authors suggested that the TPQ requires 
further refinement using techniques such as item analysis, multitrait 
multimethod assessment and longitudinal data gathering before it can be used 
confidently to test Cloninger's biosocial theory. 
6. CONCLUSION: 
The psychometric studies of the TPQ highlight an important issue for the 
instrument and the theory as a whole; is the instrument measuring the genetic 
substrates which are theoretically independent, or is it measuring the 
phenotypic structure of personality? Problems demonstrating the 
independence of the three TPQ dimensions could indicate that the latter is 
more appropriate. This then casts doubt on the ability of the TPQ to measure 
the proposed genetic dimensions psychometrically. Cloninger's claim that his 
dimensions reflect the genotypic personality structure, as compared to other 
scales such as Eysenck's and Zuckerman's which he states tend to measure the 
interactions that form the phenotype, may also be premature. 
It is clear from the studies presented that the TPQ has certain limitations as a 
psychometric instrument. It is, however, still in its early stages, as is 
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evidenced by the number of revisions it has undergone in the last five years. 
Much conceptual and empirical work is still needed to ensure that the TPQ is 
adequately measuring the hypothesised dimensions of NS, HA, and RD in 
particular. Refinements are inevitable as further testing is carried out. At this 
stage, however, it provides a useful measure that has acceptable reliability and 
validity. 
With regard to the biological evidence Cloninger presents, there is no doubt 
that he has oversimplified the complex neurochemical systems involved in the 
regulation of behaviour and personality. His transgression was not so much 
to do this, however, but in neglecting to spell out the important role that other 
neurochemicals have in regulating behaviour. As Nurnberger (1988) states, "it 
is useful to have the 3 monoamines as 'emblematic' neurotransmitters, but 
perhaps misleading to allow the reader to form the impression that they are in 
any sense exclusively implicated in the expression of personality" (p. 76). 
It is clear that criticism of the details of Cloninger' s supporting evidence is 
justified, and that the current conceptualisation is likely to undergo much 
modification and change as measurement techniques become more 
sophisticated and further testing is carried out. As Cloninger (1988a) himself 
states, "there are limitations and gaps in each one of these lines of evidence, 
but together they provide the basis for a coherent model to guide future 
research" (p. 15). While it is unwise to ignore Eysenck's warning to take care 
when interpreting specific data to support a particular theory, it would be 
equally foolish to neglect the potential contribution that this theory has for the 
study of personality. 
Cloninger has provided personality researchers with a scientifically testable 
base from which to discover more accurate neurochemical and genetic models 
within an integrated framework. There is no doubt that this model will 
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change dramatically over the course of time and that the result will be very 
different from the present conceptualisation. Without such a basis from which 
to work, however, this process would be slower, more fragmented and similar 
problems would still exist. It cannot be disregarded that this theory is a 
careful and thorough attempt to integrate recent neurochemical studies into a 
biosocial framework. It represents a major advance over past theories which 
have attempted to do this, both in its attention to large amounts of diverse 
information, its ease of conceptualisation, and its potential for testing. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Psychobiological Model of 
Temperament and Character 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
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Since its presentation in 1986, the 'unified biosocial theory of personality' has 
undergone a significant revision to become the 'psychobiological model of 
temperament and character.' This relabelling represents two fundamental 
changes from Cloninger's original theory of personality. While his definition 
remains essentially unchanged, the conceptualisation of personality has 
become broader to encompass the two separate but related domains of 
temperament and character. In addition, there has been an extension of the 
theoretical base, as is suggested by the use of the word 'psychobiological.' 
Cloninger and his associates have incorporated several new theoretical 
perspectives in their extensions to the earlier theory, including humanistic and 
transpersonal psychology, as well as research from the areas of social and 
cognitive development. 
This chapter reviews these recent developments, which are outlined in two 
articles due to be published in 1993. · The focus of this chapter is the first 
article, which describes the rationale for the new character dimensions and 
presents results from preliminary testing of the new model (Cloninger, 
Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1992). The second article investigates applications of the 
extended model to the area of personality disorders, and is discussed in the 
following chapter (Svrakic et al., 1992). After the rationale for extending the 
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model is presented and the character dimensions are described, the model will 
be discussed within the wider context of personality development. Because 
the authors specifically state that the model is one of personality structure and 
development, several major issues in this area are presented in order to assess 
the psychobiological model's compatibility with the existing literature. 
2. RECENT CHANGES TO CLONINGER'S 
CONCEPTUALISATION: 
The psychobiological model of temperament and character now comprises 
seven dimensions, and the original personality dimensions of NS, HA, and RD 
have been relabelled temperament dimensions. Persistence is now considered 
to be a fourth temperament variable as a result of studies using the TPQ which 
demonstrated it to be an independently heritable factor from RD (Cloninger et 
al., 1992). The three new dimensions are considered to be character variables 
and are distinguished from the temperament dimensions in terms of two 
distinct memory systems and their influence on learning. Temperament, they 
state, involves information processing by the perceptual memory system, 
while that of character is defined as being conceptually based. 
The three character dimensions rely heavily on the description of concepts 
from humanistic psychology, and are labelled self-directedness (SD), 
cooperativeness (C), and self-transcendence (ST). Cloninger and his associates 
(1992) state that these factors are related to "the extent to which the individual 
identifies the self as (1) an autonomous individual, (2) as an integral part of 
society, and (3) as an integral part of the unity of all things (ie., the universe, 
which denotes everything turned into one interdependent whole)". 
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The decision to extend the model to include these character dimensions was 
based on two main considerations. First, it was an attempt to improve the 
utility of the model in the area of personality disorder diagnosis (which will be 
discussed in the following chapter), and second, it was to make the model 
more comprehensive. The original TPQ research had found certain variables, 
such as "unpopularity" among 11 year old children, that were not accounted 
for by the NS, HA, and RD dimensions (Sigvardsson, Bohman, & Cloninger, 
1987). Cloninger et al. also cite studies that demonstrate the failure of the TPQ 
to correlate with established personality factors from other models of 
personality; such as the agreeability scale of the NEO personality inventory 
(Costa & McCrae, 1985), and the aggression and alienation scales of the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen, 1985). In addition, the 
authors describe variables from the wider personality literature (such as self-
acceptance, responsibility, self-esteem, absorption or self-forgetful 
concentration), of which none appeared to be measured by the TPQ or 
explained by the original biosocial theory. 
2.1 THEORETICAL RATIONALE: 
In the original conceptualisation, Cloninger had described neural mechanisms 
of response to various environmental stimuli such as novelty, danger, and 
reward (Cloninger, 1986). Individual heritable biases in these responses were 
considered to be the biological building blocks of personality structure. 
Cloninger and his associates (1992) now believe that he was mistaken to label 
NS, HA, and RD as personality dimensions, claiming instead that these three 
dimensions are better conceptualised as temperament, given their heritability 
and manifestation in early life. Essentially these dimensions are the genotypes 
of the original theory. 
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When distinguishing temperament from character, Cloninger et al. (1992) once 
again draw on neuroanatomical research, this time discussing the role of 
memory in the learning processes which, they state, ultimately shape 
personality. The authors discuss evidence for two distinct types of memory 
systems in primates, ~hich they then relate to temperament and character. 
The first is thought to be conceptually driven, involving the explicit processing 
of words, images or symbols. Retrieval is conscious and humans are able to 
act on that information intentionally. This type of memory, they state, is an 
integral component in the development of character traits. The second 
memory system, in contrast, is perceptually driven, involving unconscious, 
implicit, and procedural memory. This system, Cloninger and his associates 
state, is related to the temperament dimensions in the model. The two systems 
are considered to be neuroanatomically separate, with the conceptual memory 
processes being carried out in the higher order brain areas of a cortico-limbo-
diencephalic system, and the perceptual memory in a lower order cortico-
striatal system. 
Cloninger and his associates hypothesise that concept-based character traits 
are defined in terms of insight learning or the reorganisation of self concepts. 
Because hum.ans convert perceptual input into conceptual memory, stimulus 
response characteristics depend on the conceptual significance of perceived 
stimuli. This means that while temperament variables control our automatic 
responses to activate, inhibit, or maintain behaviour, such responses can be 
modified and conditioned by changes in the significance of stimuli related to 
our sense of identity. According to this group of researchers, "from this 
perspective, personality development is seen as an iterative epigenetic process 
in which heritable temperament factors initially motivate insight learning of 
self concepts, which in turn modify the significance and salience of perceived 
stimuli to which the person responds" (Cloninger et al., 1992) 
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In further support of their argument, Cloninger and his associates describe 
ethological research which, they state, indicate a phylogeny of temperament. 
An ethological hierarchy of the three temperament variables had been 
presented earlier by Cloninger and Gilligan (1987). Beginning with the 
behavioural inhibition system (HA) that is present in all animals, the next level 
in the hierarchy was the activation system (NS) which is present only in more 
advanced animals. Finally, the maintenance system (RD) appears to be 
evident only in reptiles and later phyla. In a similar way, Cloninger et al. 
(1992) now propose that the higher order memory system involved in 
character development evolved later than the more primitive perceptual 
memory system on which temperament is based. Despite the separation of 
persistence in the new model, the authors do not mention where it fits into this 
ethological hierarchy. 
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARACTER VARIABLES: 
Research into aspects of personality that were uncorrelated with the TPQ, led 
Cloninger and his associates to believe that they reflected concepts such as the 
acceptance of the individual self, acceptance of others, and acceptance of 
nature in general. In a review of these psychological concepts they found that 
the so-called mature personality (ie. able to adapt effectively, obtaining self-
satisfaction) is self-reliant, cooperative and possibly self-transcendent. In 
contrast, those individuals with personality disorders have problems with self-
acceptance, are intolerant of others, and feel self-conscious and unfulfilled. In 
order to make these hypotheses testable, Cloninger and his team extended the 
TPQ to provide descriptions of SD, C, and ST. 
In each of the following descriptions it is notable that the authors have 
referred to the character variables in terms of developmental processes. What 
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these processes are or how they manifest themselves, however, is not directly 
addressed. There appears to be a certain ambivalence in this description, with 
their use of the phrase "aspects or stages". The two words are used by the 
authors interchangeably, but it is clear that they are conceptually quite 
different. Given the lack of explanation as to what these developmental stages 
are, the word 'aspects' alone may have provided more clarity until more is 
known about these stages. 
In their description of self-directedness, Cloninger and his associates (1992) 
cited research on the following concepts; 'will-power' (Watson & Tharp, 1989), 
responsibility for actions (Leach, 1987), self-esteem and the ability to accept 
one's limitations (Adler, 1930), locus of control (Rotter, 1966), purposefulness 
and meaningful goal direction (Frankl, 1984), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982), and 
finally the development of automatic responses congruent with individual 
goals and values (Kasulis, 1987). Based on an amalgam of this research, they 
propose that SD is "a developmental process with several stages or aspects. 
These include: 
(1) acceptance of responsibility for one's own choices instead of 
blaming other people and circumstances, 
(2) identification of individually valued goals and purposes vs 
lack of goal direction, 
(3) development of skills and confidence in solving problems 
(resourcefulness vs apathy), 
(4) self acceptance vs self-striving, and finally 
(5) congruent second-nature vs personal distrust''. 
The second character variable of cooperativeness is based on observed 
individual differences in the identification with and acceptance of others. The 
authors cite the work of Rogers, Erikson, Maslow, Adler and Kohlberg in their 
description of this concept. They propose that "cooperativeness can be 
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formulated as a developmental process with several aspects or stages. These 
include; 
(1) social acceptance vs intolerance, 
(2) empathy vs social disinterest, 
(3) helpfulness vs unhelpfulness, 
(4) compassion vs revengefulness, and 
(5) purehearted principles vs self-advantage". 
Self-transcendence is the third character variable proposed by Cloninger et al. 
(1992), and is based on phenomena that they state have been neglected by 
other contemporary personality researchers. ST is derived from diverse areas 
such as religious research (Princeton Religion Research Center, 1982), research 
on the lives of mystics and saints (White, 1985), Maslow's concept of self-
actualisation (Maslow, 1970), the insight meditation techniques of 
transpersonal psychology (Wilber, 1985), the concept of unitive consciousness 
(Underhill, 1911), and transpersonal identification with things outside the self 
as a result of intense concentration or absorption (Maslow, 1971). This latter 
phenomenon is linked to the idea of spiritual acceptance which has also been 
emphasised in the description of self-transcendence. 
Cloninger and his associates acknowledge difficulties with the metaphorical 
nature of this area, citing Shaku (1906) who proposed that these experiences 
were cognitively intuitive rather than analytical and deductive. Self-
transcendence is described as a developmental process with stages or aspects 
that are relevant to a wide range of populations and cultures. These are; 
"(1) self-forgetful vs self-conscious experience, 
(2) transpersonal identification (ie., identification with nature) 
vs self-differentiation, and 
(3) spiritual acceptance vs rational materialism". 
This character variable appears to be the least well understood of the seven 
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dimensions, but the authors state that it deserves further systematic study in 
order to clarify its significance in the area of personality. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL TESTING OF THE MODEL: 
From this review of the literature, questions were generated for each of the 13 
rationally defined character factors described in the previous section (5 each 
for SD and C, 3 for ST). These items were pretested on college students and 
any items having extreme response frequencies or poor intrascale correlations 
were discarded (Cloninger et al., 1992). This resulted in a 119-item character 
inventory measuring SD, C, and ST, examples of which are given in table 2. 
These items were added to the 107 item TPQ (measuring NS, HA, RD and the 
now separate dimension of persistence), to make up the 226 item 
Temperament Character Inventory (TCI). 
Cloninger and his associates (1992) report the results of testing done with the 
TCI on 300 adults in the St. Louis area. The sample, which included 150 
women and 150 men, was compared with earlier testing of the TPQ with a 
national probability sample (Cloninger et al., 1991) and was found to be 
equally as representative. Each of the temperament and character scales 
showed a high level of internal consistency ranging from .76 to .89, with the 
exception of the persistence scale which had a Cronbach Alpha of .65. 
Principle component analysis of the 13 character subscales found that three 
factors accounted for 59% of the variance. Each character subscale loaded on a 
separate factor with the exception of 'self-acceptance' which loaded more 
highly with the C subscales than the SD scales. This, the authors concluded, 
may indicate that the ability to accept one's own limitations is correlated with 
the ability to accept them in others. 
TABLE 2. 
SAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM THE TEMPERAMENT- CHARACTER 
INVENTORY; 
SELF-DIRECTEDNESS: 
* My behaviour is strongly guided by certain goals that I 
have set for myself. 
* Many of my habits make it hard for me to 
accomplish worthwhile goals. 
COOPERATIVENESS: 
* I like to help find a solution to problems so that 
everyone comes out ahead. 
* It is usually foolish to promote the success of other people. 
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE: 
* I sometimes feel so connected to nature that 
everything seems to be part of one living organism. 
* Sometimes I have felt my life was being guided by a 
spiritual force greater than any human being. 
(Cited in Cloninger et. al., 1992) 
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When correlations between all seven scales were carried out, it was found that 
HA was negatively correlated with SD (-.47), and C was correlated with both 
RD (.54) and SD (.57). Principle component analysis identified seven clear 
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factors accounting for 65% of the variance. After rotation it was found that 
each subscale had highest loadings on the predicted factor, with the exception 
of RD. The only postulated RD factor that loaded highly was 'attachment vs 
detachment'; with 'sentimentality vs insensitiveness' and 'dependence vs 
independence' both loading more highly with the C subscales. Cloninger and 
his associates comment. on problems with the persistence factor which 
although loading as a distinct seventh dimension also had positive 
correlations with several SD subscales, and negative correlations with three of 
the temperament scales. For this reason, the authors conclude, persistence 
should only tentatively be considered a temperament factor. 
The character scales were also examined for effects of gender, ethnicity, and 
age. There were no gender differences in SD, however women had 
significantly higher total scores for C and the 'spiritual acceptance' subscale of 
ST. Ethnicity had virtually no effect, accounting for less than 3% of variance in 
any scale. Age correlations provided some interesting data, with both SD and 
C being positively correlated with age. These data will be considered more 
fully in a later section. 
Cloninger and his associates (1992) concluded that these empirical results 
support a tridimensional model of character structure, with each factor 
demonstrating an epigenetic development of increasingly inclusive concepts 
of the self; as an individual, as a part of society and the universe. They state 
that this also "supports the hypothesis that personality is a complex 
hierarchical system that can be naturally decomposed into distinct dimensions 
of temperament and character''(Cloninger et al., 1992). 
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3. CRITIQUE OF THE NEW MODEL: 
Given that this is the first presentation of the character model, it is clear that, 
like the original theory, it will change as more research is conducted. The 
theory has now become a model, and it is possible that this indicates a desire 
to create a more flexible outline than was the case with earlier descriptions of 
the theory. This section will discuss the model according to the description 
given above, following which it will be viewed within the broader context of 
personality development. 
The reasons for extending the model to include character dimensions, that is, 
to make the model more comprehensive and increase its practical utility, are 
both clear and commendable. The rationale used for doing so, however, is not 
so readily apparent. The only clear evidence provided by the authors for 
postulating a difference between temperament and character is that two 
distinct memory systems exist, one having evolved later than the first. They 
state that these memory systems and their influence on personality have been 
neglected in previous models because of the reliance on factor analysis of 
behaviour rather than underlying causal determinants. 
The general relevance of the perceptual and conceptual memory systems to 
personality processes seems plausible, but the nature of that relation and how 
it is manifested as temperament and character is not elaborated on. Given that 
these memory systems have an essential role in the rationale for the character 
variables, further detail about their involvement would have made their 
hypotheses stronger. 
This is not to suggest that supporting information does not exist. By referring 
to memory systems and their influence on human behaviour, Cloninger et al. 
(1992) have alluded to a large body of research in cognitive psychology and 
neuroanatomical research. They have done so, however, without full 
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explanation or recognition of that research and its relevance to the 
psychobiological model. In a similar way, the use of literature from 
humanistic self psychology seems to merely scratch the surface of the concepts 
and theories involved. The authors have added even more perspectives to an 
already broad theoretical base, but it is arguable whether this has given the 
model more explanatory depth. It appears that in their efforts to be 
comprehensive, Cloninger and his associates have become overinclusive, 
sacrificing depth for breadth of information. 
The rationale for increasing the number of dimensions from three to seven 
should also be viewed with some caution. Cloninger's initial rationale for 
including only three dimensions was stated as, "Empirical factor analyses 
consistently indicate that there are three major dimensions of normal 
personality variation in the general population" (Cloninger, 1987, p. 574). In 
the rationale to extend the model to incorporate seven dimensions, however, it 
is stated that, "Five factors, plus or minus two, have been suggested to provide 
a comprehensive model of personality in the general population" and later, 
"Studies of natural language provide evidence for seven dimensions of 
personality" (Cloninger et al., 1992). This somewhat arbitrary citing of 
literature with no adequate explanation seems to avoid the important issue of 
number and nature of personality dimensions, rather than clarify it. 
In addition, the authors make no clear statement that this is indeed the end of 
their hypothesised dimensions. At one point it is stated that "what is left out 
of one model can be added until a comprehensive set (of personality 
dimensions) is accumulated"(Cloninger et al., 1992). This in itself is not 
problematic given that every theory is subject to modification as new evidence 
becomes available. What is debatable, however, is the inconsistent use of 
literature to justify the number of dimensions included in the theory at various 
points in its development. 
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Given that there are still problems with the original dimension of RD, from 
which the new dimension of persistence has arisen, a case may be argued that 
if these are indeed temperament variables then they should be established and 
consolidated first. In the recent data examining the factor structure of the TCI, 
each dimension shows clear loadings on separate factors with the exception of 
RD. Persistence has a separate factor as Cloninger et al. describe, but two 
subscales of RD, 'sentimentality' and 'dependence', both load more highly on 
the C factor, leaving RD to be signified solely by 'attachment'. The dimension 
of RD has consistently demonstrated problems since the original development 
of the TPQ. Despite numerous alterations it still has the lowest internal 
consistency of all the scales with the exception of persistence. Such problems 
indicate a need for more basic work to be carried out to clarify the nature of 
the temperament dimensions. 
With these points in mind, the psychobiological model is now reviewed with 
respect to three important issues in the field of personality development, that 
is, the definition of temperament, the separation of genetic and environmental 
influences, and the temporal stability of personality in adult life. 
4. RELATION TO THE TEMPERAMENT LITERATURE: 
Cloninger et al. (1992) are not the first to distinguish between the terms 
personality, temperament and character. They have often been used 
interchangeably in the literature, however, and as a result, remained poorly 
defined for some time (Siefer & Sameroff, 1986). More recently, temperament 
has come to be generally defined as the nature component of personality, and 
character the nurture (Vaillant, 1987). While temperament is considered to be 
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determined largely by biology and genetics, character is thought to be shaped 
by the social environment and the way in which the individual responds to 
that environment. The intricacies of individual personality are said to reflect 
the complex interactions of the two. 
By far the most researched and controversial of the two terms is temperament, 
and it has provoked much debate in the literature since its introduction as a 
scientifically testable concept in the 1950's (Plomin & Dunn, 1986). Rutter 
(1987) suggested in a review of this topic that the concept is far more complex 
than one would first expect. He stated that some writers believe that 
temperament is reflected only in biologically influenced behavioural styles (eg. 
Kagan, 1971), while others see it purely in terms of subclinical psychiatric 
disorder (Stevenson & Graham, 1982). Still others argue that temperament 
does not exist, instead viewing it as a function of parental percepts (Bates, 
1980), or a result of situational influences (Mischel, 1968). 
The most usual definitions of temperament, however, focus on manifestation 
in early life, the influence of genetic factors, and stability over time (Wilson & 
Matheny, 1986). Although the last of these criteria is no longer considered to 
be essential, given the maturational changes believed to be associated with 
personality development (Bates, 1986), the others have also been argued to be 
neither sufficient nor necessary for the definition of temperament. As Rutter 
(1987) stated, much of behaviour has a genetic component and heritability of 
personality characteristics generally rise with age. 
Despite such definitional problems, Rutter (1987) stated, there are certain 
issues that are no longer considered controversial in the field of temperament. 
For example, there are reasonably reliable measurements of individual 
differences in children, these differences influence the ways in which other 
people respond to them, and they are meaningful in terms of their 
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implications for later development and psychiatric risk. After reviewing the 
literature he concluded that these 'temperament' characteristics are simple, 
non-motivational, non-cognitive, stylistic, and represent meaningful ways of 
distinguishing individuals. While generally appearing in early childhood, he 
stated, this does not limit their relevance to childhood alone. 
At first glance the psychobiological model's definition of temperament 
appears to fit this summary quite well. NS, HA, RD and persistence, 
according to Cloninger and his associates, have all been demonstrated to be 
heritable (Heath, Cloninger, & Martin, 1992). Cloninger has often cited a 
study using behavioural ratings with children that he states confirms the 
manifestation of temperament dimensions in early life (Sigvardsson et al., 
1987). In addition, the introduction of reliance on a perceptual memory 
system as a defining factor in temperament appears to fit Rutter's simple, non-
cognitive description of temperament. An added advantage is that 
Cloninger' s temperament factors are measurable in adults. 
On closer examination, however, this apparent fit with the temperament-
character distinction in the literature begins to weaken. Cloninger et al. (1992) 
state that genetic factors are likely to be just as important as they are in 
temperament, effectively removing any distinction based on heritability. In 
addition, the research cited as evidence for the manifestation of NS, HA, and 
RD in early life, was based on teacher ratings of children's behaviour at ages 
11 and 15. These ratings were recorded 17 years before Cloninger himself 
converted them into scores on the three dimensions, a procedure which creates 
some doubt as to their validity. Despite this less than perfect methodology no 
other attempt has been made to rate children let alone infants on these 
temperamental measures. Finally, Cloninger and his associates make no 
mention of the literature that has developed concerning temperament, 
preferring instead to base their distinction on the difference between the 
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perceptual and conceptual memory systems alone (Cloninger et al., 1992). 
5. GENE-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION: 
Most researchers in the field of personality development agree that the highest 
priority for research is in the area of gene-environment interaction, rather than 
the individual influence of one or the other (Buss & Plomin, 1986). According 
to Super and Harkness (1986), processes involved in the links between 
individual temperament differences and environmental influence are of 
central importance to developmental theory. They argue, however, that work 
in this area has remained largely theoretical with few attempts to test 
hypotheses and methodological difficulties in those that have. Given that 
Cloninger's theory is grounded in genetics and now postulates a role for the 
environment, what, if anything, does it have to offer this field? 
In the original presentation of the theory, Cloninger emphasised that the 
phenotypic structure of personality was different from the genotypic structure. 
Heritable variables were said to interact with the environment to result in the 
phenotype. However, little was said about the processes involved in this 
interaction, nor about what it was in the environment with which the 
temperament variables were interacting. In the new proposal the character 
variables are said to have developed, in an evolutionary sense, later than the 
temperament dimensions, and appear to have greater input from the 
environment in the shaping of personality. The interactions of both 
temperament and character are now thought to result in the personality 
phenotype. Cloninger and his associates (1992) describe this interaction as 
follows; "Our unconscious, automatic responses to initiate, maintain or stop 
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behaviour are initially determined by temperament factors, but these can be 
modified and conditioned as a result of changes in the significance and 
salience of stimuli that are determined by our concept of our identity". 
In other words, genetics influence temperament, which is influenced by 
character, which is in tum influenced by the environment. However, there is 
still no clear indication as to what the environmental influences are that shape 
character and how they make up the phenotype. The only proposal in the new 
model is that it is the individual's perception of the environment that is 
important, rather than the environment per se. This is indicated by a minor 
change to Cloninger' s initial definition of personality, with the word 
'environment' being replaced by 'experience', so that it now reads; "individual 
differences in the adaptive systems involved in the reception, processing, and 
storing of information about experience define personality in general" 
(Cloninger et al., 1992). Other than this, however, direct explanations of the 
interactions of genes and environment, along with any reference to the 
relevant literature, remain conspicuously absent from the extensions to the 
model. 
In his reliance on genetic and neuroanatomical causal data, Cloninger and his 
associates have neglected an important body of literature which investigates 
the influence of both specific and general environmental factors on 
personality development (see Rutter, 1984 for a review). This literature is 
highly relevant to the thesis presented by Cloninger et al. (1992). One example 
is their statement that environmental effects associated with particular families 
and cultures should be more important in character development than in 
temperament. Although still controversial, the concept of non-shared 
environment has forced a reappraisal of this general hypothesis. It has been 
found that despite careful research, shared environment has a negligible 
contribution to personality development, implying that it is non-shared 
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individually relevant experiences that are important (see for example, the 
March 1987 issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences for a multi disciplinary 
discussion of this debate). 
Despite the assertion by Cloninger and his associates (1992) that "personality 
is a complex hierarchical system that can be naturally decomposed into 
distinct dimensions of temperament and character", this distinction is far from 
clear as was previously discussed. The problems with the RD subscales may 
be an indication of this. For example, if several of the RD subscales load 
highly with the C subscales, it may be that they are measuring phenotypic 
variation rather than genotypic variation. Given this situation and similar 
problems with other personality scales, it is conceivable that the full separation 
of adult personality scales into genetics and environment may not be possible. 
Measuring genetic and temperamental influences on personality in adults is 
fraught with difficulties. It is unlikely that temperament is unchanged by 
interactions with the environment, and this view is reflected in the vague 
terminology of temperament definitions, which use qualifiers such as 'largely' 
inheritable, and genetically 'based'. The question then becomes when do 
environmental effects begin to interact with heritable tendencies and shape 
personality, and in what way? 
6. LIFESPAN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT: 
Personality stability has historically been viewed from two perspectives, that 
of cross-situational generality and temporal stability. The first of these has 
provoked one of the most controversial and indeed crucial debates in the 
history of personality theory and research (Millon, 1984). For several decades 
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the question of personality stability across situations was roundly challenged. 
Recently, however, this debate appears to be resolving with the consensus 
being that inappropriate methodologies were largely responsible for the lack 
of data showing cross-situational generality (see Epstein & O'Brien, 1985, for a 
review). 
The issue of temporal stability has received less attention, however, although 
longitudinal studies have generally indicated considerable consistency of 
personality characteristics over time (Block, 1971; Conley, 1985). Unlike 
temperament, which is usually studied in infants and young children, the 
stability of personality is generally measured in later life. There is an 1.mplicit 
assumption that although changes may occur in childhood and adolescence, 
once an individual reaches adulthood, personality development is likely to 
remain fairly stable. 
Links between these two periods of personality development are rarely made 
explicit with researchers tending to focus on temperament as manifested in 
early life, or personality in adulthood rather than the connections between 
them. Perhaps due to the lack of previous work in this area, Cloninger and his 
associates (1992) have also neglected this aspect of personality development. 
While they state that the character variables reflect developmental processes, 
they do not make explicit what these processes involve or how they relate to 
the temperament variables. Despite this lack of clarity, however, Cloninger et 
al. (1992) do present some interesting data demonstrating significant 
differences in their character variables across age cohorts. While the authors 
caution that these findings are only tentative due to their cross-sectional 
nature, they also note that they warrant further longitudinal testing to clarify 
their importance. 
Earlier testing with the temperament dimensions had showed NS to be 
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negatively correlated with age for both males and females, while RD was 
negatively correlated with age in women alone (Cloninger et al., 1991). These 
latest data show that both SD and C were significantly correlated with age, 
while ST was not (Cloninger et al., 1992). Self-directedness subscales 
demonstrated an increasing trend which levelled off at about age 40, with the 
exception of 'self congruence' which continued to climb. The C subscales 
showed a sharp increase between the ages of 20-30 and continued to increase 
steadily with the exception of 'principles' which after a decrease in the 25 to 35 
year range increased once more. Although the age correlations with ST were 
not significant, there were some interesting trends, with 'self-forgetfulness' 
and 'transpersonal identification' decreasing to the age of 35 and then levelling 
off, while 'spiritual acceptance' increased to age 40 then declined. 
These results have some interesting implications for personality stability 
during adulthood, implications which are contrary to the majority of studies in 
recent years which have found the weight of evidence supporting general 
stability (Costa & McRae, 1986). Cloninger and his associates' data on 
character variables across the life span warrant the hypothesis that variables 
such as these do indeed show some predictable changes throughout life. Of 
course, any such hypothesising must be tentative until longitudinal data can 
be gathered, however, there is a possibility that 'personality' is not as fixed or 
permanent as the data to this point have suggested. In addition, these data 
also give support to Cloninger's assertion that these variables are tapping into 
dimensions that other personality theorists have neglected. 
Costa and McCrae (1986) conclude their review of the implications of 
personality stability for clinical psychology by emphasising that clinicians 
need to revise their expectations for personality change in their clients, stating 
that, "human nature is by no means easily changed" (p. 420). This conclusion 
is understandable given the therapeutic nihilism that has surrounded 
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personality disorders and the literature on the stability of normal personality 
traits. If cooperativeness and self-directedness are found to increase reliably 
across the age span, however, such a view may be premature. Studying these 
processes in more detail may provide a better understanding of personality 
development and possibilities for treatment of personality difficulties. 
7. CONCLUSIONS: 
As Rutter (1987) concludes in his review of personality development, "No 
single mechanism is responsible and no one theory provides an explanation. 
Equally, however, the solution does not lie in any amalgam of all views. There 
are immense difficulties in any search for an overall explanation for the 
developmental process, but each of the links in the chain is susceptible to 
empirical analysis. Therein lies the possibility of understanding what is 
involved in personality development" (p. 325). 
The psychobiological model has the appearance of a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for personality development. The authors have 
incorporated several very different points of view into one theory, ranging 
from behavioural principles of learning to spiritual aspects of humanistic 
psychology. In this latest presentation of the character variables, however, the 
citation of literature has sometimes been selective and almost simplistic. 
Cloninger and his associates appear to have neglected research that is very 
relevant to their proposal, while at the same time citing vast quantities of 
literature with little clarification of their underlying principles and how that 
relates to the model proposed. 
Leaving aside these omissions, Cloninger's concepts may still falter in the area 
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of personality development, coming as they do from an adult perspective. The 
question must be raised that although the TPQ dimensions are measurable in 
adults, can they be directly measured in children or even be meaningful? If 
they are, at what age does it become appropriate to measure them? For 
example, is it possible to measure NS, HA, RD, and persistence in infants? 
This would seem a difficult task with the dimensions framed as they are, for 
adults. If these dimensions are unidentifiable in infants, this would indicate 
that Cloninger's conceptualisation of them as temperament does not fit with 
the current emphasis on childhood. Finally, would it have been more 
appropriate for Cloninger to label the three original dimensions more simply 
as tendencies toward behavioural activation, inhibition and maintenance? 
This would have provided better opportunity for measurement at an earlier 
age and would have reduced the confounding effects of environmental 
interactions when measuring temperament. 
Partly as a result of these difficulties, the theoretical distinction between 
temperament and character in the model requires further clarification. The 
authors' use of the terms temperament and character, while generally 
consistent with the wider literature does not provide an adequate explanation 
of connections with this literature or even citation of it. Their rationale for 
using the terms appears to be based more on the face validity of the 
conceptual and perceptual memory systems, rather than a full consideration of 
the issues and controversies involved. As a result it is unclear what their use 
of the term character adds to our understanding of personality structure and 
development. These details must be carefully examined and clarified before 
the importance of the psychobiological model's character variables can be fully 
accepted. 
Should these details be clarified, it is clear that the temperament and character 
scales of the TCI provide the means to test some interesting concepts raised by 
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the psychobiological model and apparent in the wider literature. As 
Cloninger et al. (1992) state, the dimensional structure of their personality 
model enables "the testing of quantitative, falsifiable hypotheses relating 
psychological variation to its biological and social causes". 
One area in which the TCI measures have research applications is in the 
investigation of the concept of shared environment. According to the 
psychobiological model, character variables are determined by the 
individual's response to the environment. This makes it possible to 
investigate patterns of response to environmental stimuli, given a particular 
character style as measured by the TCI. For example, if character is likely to 
determine responses to the environment, an individual high in ST is likely to 
respond differently to a life threatening illness than someone who is low on 
this variable. In addition, it would be possible to measure character changes 
following such an event to determine the effect of the environment on 
character. 
In conclusion, it appears that the area of personality development provides the 
psychobiological model of temperament and character with many challenges. 
Rather than provide an 'amalgam of all views', however, the model's greatest 
potential contribution is in its capacity for the generation of new hypotheses 
and the empirical analysis of those hypotheses. It is likely that as data are 
gathered not only will 'links in the chain' of personality development be better 
understood, but the theoretical clarity of the model will undoubtedly improve 
also. 
CHAPTER FIVE 




When Cloninger first proposed the biosocial theory of personality it was in the 
areas of anxiety and alcohol abuse that much of his research was focused. He 
was quick to recognise, however, the possible applications of his theory to the 
problematic area of personality disorders. In 1987, Cloninger published his 
first article devoted solely to the "clinical description and classification of 
personality variants"(p. 573). In this article, he described the problems 
currently facing the area as being the frequency with which multiple 
personality diagnoses are given to individuals, the arbitrary nature of the 
distinction between maladaptive personality traits and personality disorders, 
the problems distinguishing personality from the influence of situational 
variables, and the difficulties associated with social desirability when 
questioning about criterion behaviours. He also defined several conceptual 
problems, most notably the choice of categorical descriptions of personality 
variation over dimensional systems, and the lack of extra-statistical 
information to provide an anchor for such personality descriptions. 
Cloninger's biosocial theory of personality was presented as a way to address 
these fundamental problems. 
This chapter will focus on the clinical and theoretical implications of both the 
temperament and character dimensions for the personality disorders. Results 
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from research using the TPQ and the TCI will be discussed, first reviewing the 
early hypotheses relating to the personality disorders, and then the role of the 
character variables in improving the temperament-character model's relevance 
to personality disorders. The TCI will then be compared to the five-factor 
model of personality before concluding with a discussion of the model's 
relevance to the personality disorders. 
2. TEMPERAMENT DIMENSIONS AND PERSONALITY 
DISORDER; 
2.1 THE THREE TIERED MODEL OF PERSONALITY VARIATION; 
The TPQ dimensions of NS, HA, and RD, were originally hypothesised to be 
able to subtype people according to a personality profile that was indicative of 
individual personality disorders. Using these dimensions, Cloninger 
proposed a three-tier model of personality variation. The first tier considered 
each of the main dimensions individually, for example, high vs low NS. The 
second order clusters described six combinations of extremes on two of the 
three dimensions, for example, variations in NS and HA being related to 
impulsive-aggressive vs rigid-patient personality traits. The third order 
clusters of personality traits, however, were those Cloninger proposed to be 
related to clinical descriptions of personality disorders. 
These eight clusters were derived from combinations of the two previous 
groups, so that individual profiles of personality variation could be 
established, for example, high NS, low HA, and low RD being indicative of 
antisocial personality disorder. Cloninger labelled these eight personality 
disorders, antisocial, histrionic, passive-aggressive, explosive, obsessional, 
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schizoid, cyclothymic, and passive-dependent. The relations of these 
disorders to the three dimensions of NS, HA, and RD can be summarised in 
the form of a cube (figure 1). For example, personality disordered individuals 
of a histrionic type should have personality profiles that demonstrate extremes 
on each of the three dimensions represented by the perpendicular axes; that is, 
high on NS, low on HA, and high on RD, so that such individuals occupy the 
top right back quadrant of the cube. 
Figure 1 Relation of Novelty Seeking, Harm Avoidance and Reward 
Dependence to the Proposed Personality Disorder Diagnoses. 














2.2 RELATION TO TRADITIONAL PERSONALITY DISORDERS: 
For each of the eight extreme combinations, Cloninger (1987) gave a brief 
description and discussed their relation to traditional descriptions of 
personality disorders. While some corresponded quite closely to the DSM-III 
descriptions, such as dependent personality disorder, others were more 
restricted, defining narrower groups than DSM-III allowed for. Schizoid 
personality disorder as described in the DSM-III, according to Cloninger, 
required indicators of low RD only. This, he stated had resulted in a highly 
heterogeneous group which can be subtyped using further information about 
NS and HA. Cloninger also used some labels not present in the DSM-ill. For 
example, he used the term cyclothymic to describe individuals low on NS, low 
on HA and high in RD. By using these personality dimensions, he stated, a 
distinction between cyclothymic personality and depressive disorders can be 
made, with personality disordered individuals having personality traits that 
are not necessarily linked to mood disturbance, such as frugality (low NS) and 
persistence (high RD). 
There were several personality disorders featured in the DSM-ill that were not 
accounted for by Cloninger' s model; that is, the narcissistic, avoidant, 
borderline, schizotypal, and paranoid. Cloninger explained that some of these 
can be included under other labels as they represent second order 
combinations (narcissistic resulting from high NS and high HA; avoidant a 
result of high RD and HA). Cloninger originally claimed that borderline 
personality disorder was a variant of histrionic personality. However, he now 
believes it to be distinct, identified by high NS, high HA and low RD 
(Cloninger, 1992, conference address); that is, what he had originally labelled 
explosive personality. Schizotypal and paranoid personality disorders, 
however, he proposed to be more appropriately described as axis I disorders 
given their distorted or defective information processing, regardless of the 
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situation. 
At the time these labels gave the theory an intuitive face validity that aroused 
the interest of clinicians working with personality disordered patients. In 
hindsight, however, it may have been premature to use such labels before 
testing the hypothesised dimension against the traditional labels and concepts 
to examine their similarities and differences. That is, by testing a large 
number of psychiatric patients and matching their diagnoses to TPQ profiles, 
it would have become clearer which labels were misleading, which required 
further refinement and so on. 
Once testing began it became clear that at least some of Cloninger's labels 
were superfluous, the explosive personality for example. In addition, 
Cloninger and his associates have since conceded that the original theory's 
inability to account for personality types such as the paranoid and schizotypal 
was a flaw in its design (Cloninger et al., 1992). Although presented as 
theoretical hypotheses, the three tier system and its corresponding labels 
proposed a level of complexity that was grounded in little more than clinical 
intuition and speculation. While the theory itself was well grounded in 
biogenetic evidence, Cloninger's means of labelling the personality extremes 
appeared to perpetuate the semantic problems of the personality disorder 
literature. 
2.3 AN INTERMEDIATE ADAPTIVE OPTIMUM: 
In this original presentation, Cloninger postulated that all personality 
dimensions have the same underlying biogenetic structure, implying that 
maladaptive traits represent extreme variants of normal traits. To elucidate 
this distinction further, Cloninger proposed the concept of an intermediate 
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adaptive optimum, whereby individuals with intermediate values are able to 
adapt to a wide variety of situations. Individuals with extreme values on 
particular dimensions, however, find these traits to be advantageous or 
disadvantageous depending on the situation in which they are manifest. 
Cloninger provided as an example the individual high in NS and low in HA, 
who would be an excellent explorer but an unhappy accountant. Those with 
extreme scores, while able to function in special situations, are disadvantaged 
by their inability to do so in a more general sense. 
The concept of an intermediate adaptive optimum highlighted the advantages 
of viewing personality in terms of a dimensional continuum as discussed 
earlier in this thesis. Viewed in terms of dimensions, adaptability is not an all 
or nothing entity, but occurs by degree and depends on situational influences. 
With adaptability spread over three dimensions it can account for personality 
problems that are not severe enough to warrant a diagnosis. For example, an 
individual high on RD but with average values on HA and NS may have 
difficulty coping with rejection from a close friend, but may be able to adapt 
well to a novel experience that is potentially dangerous. 
2.4 DIMENSIONAL ADVANTAGES; 
The biosocial theory provides a clear illustration of the advantages of a 
dimensional classification system for the personality disorders. Earlier, it was 
noted that although dimensional classification is desirable for this area, no 
acceptable method of doing so had been found. Cloninger (1987) proposed 
that by using the TPQ it was possible to simplify, systematise and quantify the 
description and diagnosis of personality deviations according to heritable 
stimulus response characteristics, while at the same time providing a means to 
incorporate traditional categorical diagnoses of personality disorders into a 
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dimensional system. Information about adaptive and maladaptive traits, he 
stated, is potentially useful in treatment settings, regardless of the theoretical 
approach taken. Finally, he hypothesised that because of these improvements 
and changed emphasis from disorder to dimensions, the pejorative 
connotations of personality diagnoses would be reduced. 
At that point, however, the theory had not been tested in relation to the 
personality disorders. In the process of conducting research on the TPQ, 
Cloninger and his associates noted that not all individuals with extreme scores 
on the three dimensions were personality disordered, according to traditional 
methods of diagnosis. Accordingly they hypothesised that additional 
variables other than NS, HA, and RD needed to be involved in the 
development of personality disorder for this to occur. Along with the 
considerations discussed in the previous chapter, this provided the motivation 
to expand and improve the biosocial theory and ultimately led to the 
development of the character dimensions of SD, C, and ST as previously 
described. 
3. CHARACTER DIMENSIONS AND PERSONALITY 
DISORDER: 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY; 
During the development of the character variables it was proposed that 
character factors common to all personality disordered individuals could be 
used to determine their presence or absence, regardless of other aspects of 
personality and psychopathology. This was tested in a recent study (Svrakic 
et al., 1992) along with the earlier hypothesis that the temperament dimensions 
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could separate the disorders into subtypes. During the course of the study, 
136 subjects were assessed using the Structured Interview for DSM-III-R 
Personality Disorders-Revised (SIDP-R) (Pfohl, Blum, Zimmerman, & Stangl, 
1989), in addition to self-report measures, including the TCI, the NEO-PI 
(Costa & McCrae, 1985), and the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology-
self-rated version (IDS-S) as a measure of mood (Rush, Giles, Schlesser, Fulton, 
Weissenberger, & Burns, 1986). 
The range and frequency of personality disorder diagnoses in this sample 
were found to be comparable to those previously reported (Stangl, Pfohl, 
Zimmerman, Bowers, & Corenthal, 1985; Trull, 1992). Of the 136 patients, 49% 
had at least one personality diagnosis. Multiple diagnoses were frequent 
ranging from one to seven per case, with the average being 2.1. A further 17 
patients (12%) were labelled 'mixed', as they had all but one of the required 
criteria for each of two personality disorders. 
The majority of diagnoses fell into Clusters B (impulsive or erratic) and C 
(fearful or anxious) of the DSM-III-R categorisation, with only 8% having a 
Cluster A diagnosis (aloof or eccentric). Histrionic, avoidant, and obsessive-
compulsive personality disorders were the most frequently diagnosed, while 
schizoid occurred in only one case, and no patients met the full set of criteria 
for schizotypal or sadistic personality disorders. Of the 134 patients with an 
axis I diagnosis, 81 % had a mood disorder. Of all axis I diagnoses, only 
dysthymia was significantly more frequent in those with personality disorder 
than without. 
There are several important characteristics of this sample which although 
mentioned by Svrakic and his associates, are not examined in terms of their 
effect on the results. For example, the small number of Cluster A diagnoses 
make extrapolation from this group more difficult. In contrast, the large 
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number of mood disordered patients may have affected the results, making 
the sample unrepresentative in relation to general psychiatric populations. In 
addition, several diagnostic categories have few or no subjects, necessitating 
analyses of symptom counts rather than diagnoses. This procedure has 
several important implications which are not emphasised by these researchers. 
Using the results from the SIDP-R dimensionally necessitates a different 
conceptualisation of personality disorder from the more traditional method of 
obtaining categorical diagnoses from it. This distinction is important to 
clarify, as results demonstrating a relation between high numbers of antisocial 
symptoms and low scores on HA, for example, does not necessarily establish 
that the diagnosis is associated with that dimension. This is most important 
with the infrequently diagnosed disorders such as schizotypal, where in this 
study, the symptom counts originate from subjects who do not have that 
disorder. In addition, problems such as overlapping criteria and the fact that 
some disorders have fewer criteria than others may create artifactual 
correlations. Bearing these points in mind, the following sections describe the 
results of this study. 
3.2 TCI VARIATION AMONG PATIENTS: 
Once again the TCI scores were examined for variability and internal 
consistency. While NS, HA, SD, C, and ST all had Cronbach Alphas ranging 
from .80 to .90, RD again demonstrated less consistency with .75, and the 
persistence scale obtained .48, indicating that there are still problems with 
these two scales. Given the ongoing difficulties with these two scales, it may 
have been useful to investigate them thoroughly to establish their validity 
before focusing attention on the character dimensions. The danger now is that 
these scales will be neglected as research efforts are concentrated on the 
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character dimensions. 
When patients with and without personality disorder were compared to the 
community sample described in the previous chapter several significant 
differences were found. Personality disordered individuals had higher scores 
on HA and lower scores on SD than all others. Non-personality disordered 
subjects differed from the general population sample on the C and RD scales, 
having higher scores on these dimensions. Finally, the general population 
sample had significantly higher scores on the ST dimension than both 
personality disordered and non-personality disordered patient groups. 
Scores on the TCI were then tested for correlations with symptom counts from 
the SIDP-R interview, to ascertain the effectiveness of the self-report 
instrument to predict tendencies toward clinical interview diagnoses. One of 
the most consistent results of the study showed that low scores on both the SD 
and C scales were correlated with high symptom counts for all DSM-111-R 
clusters of personality disorders. In addition each cluster was associated with 
a particular temperament variable so that Cluster A symptoms were correlated 
with low RD, Cluster B with high NS, and Cluster C with high HA. 
3.3 PREDICTION OF PERSONALITY DISORDER USING TCI 
CHARACTER SCALES: 
When personality disorder symptom clusters were considered individually, 
SD and C were found to be negatively correlated with them all. Only 3 of 28 
correlations failed to reach significance (SD and schizoid; C and avoidant; C 
and dependent personality disorder). The only significant correlation for the 
ST dimension, however, was a negative correlation with schizoid symptoms. 
To analyse this further, Svrakic and associates carried out a stepwise logistic 
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regression in order to determine the usefulness of TCI scores in predicting the 
presence or absence of any personality disorder. SD was found to be a highly 
significant predictor (partial R = .54, p<.0001), with C also being an important 
contributor (partial R = .30, p<.05). None of the other five factors were 
significant. 
The overall rank correlation between the logistic function and the presence or 
absence of personality disorder was also highly significant. Examination of 
the relation of personality disorder and SD alone demonstrated that the 
observed percentages were remarkably similar to those predicted by the 
logistic function. These results are summarised in table 3. SD scores were also 
shown to predict the number of personality disorder diagnoses with those 
scoring higher than 30 having an average of 0.6 diagnoses as compared to 
those scoring less than 20 who had an average of 2.3 diagnoses. Svrakic and 
his associates do not report whether these differences are significant. 
TABLE 3. 
PREDICTED AND OBSERVED PERSONALITY DISORDER IN 
RELATION TO SELF-DIRECTEDNESS SCORES ON THE TCI. 
SD Score Predicted Percent PD 
Higher than 30 13 - 33 % 
20 - 30 44 - 66 % 
Less than 20 70 - 85 % 
Observed PD 
25 % (13/51) 
43 % (22/51) 
91 % (31/34) 
It was also found that using C scores helped further delineate the risk of 
personality disorder. For those who scored higher than 20 on SD, higher C 
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scores appeared to reduce the risk of personality disorder. For those patients 
who scored less than 20 on SD, however, there was a high risk of personality 
disorder regardless of their C score. 
3.4 RELATION OF TEMPERAMENT TO PERSONALITY DISORDER 
SYMPTOMS: 
This study by Svrakic and his associates was the first attempt to test the 
relation of the temperament scales to personality disorder symptoms 
measured by a structured interview. From the results it is possible to match 
Cloninger's early predictions about the relation of the temperament variables 
of NS, HA, and RD, to personality disorder subtypes. This matching is 
summarised in table 4 where the predicted profiles of personality disorders 
from the TPQ are compared to significant correlations of NS, HA, and RD 
dimensions with personality disorder symptoms gathered from clinical 
interview with the SIDP-R. For example, Cloninger's original prediction for 
antisocial personality disorder was high NS, low HA and RD. This most 
recent study demonstrates that antisocial personality disorder is in fact 
correlated with high NS and low RD, but not significantly with low HA. 
In this recent manuscript, Svrakic et al. have presented this information in a 
three dimensional model similar to that in figure 1 (Svrakic et al., 1992). The 
model illustrates correlations of the personality disorders with the 
temperament dimensions and is presented slightly differently from that in 
table 4, in that personality disorders are positioned according to all levels of 
correlation regardless of significance. In this way it is possible to determine 
each individual personality disorder's profile in relation to the others. For 
example, although histrionic personality disorder did not significantly 
correlate with reward dependence, histrionic symptoms demonstrate one of 
TABLE 4. 
COMPARISON OF PREDICTED PERSONALITY DISORDER 
PROFILE USING TEMPERAMENT DIMENSIONS AND 
CORRELATIONS WITH PERSONALITY DISORDER SYMPTOMS 
FROM THE SIDP-R. 
TPQ Label Predicted Significant DSM-III-R 
Profile* Correlations ** Label 
Antisocial NS ha rd NS rd Antisocial 
Histrionic NS ha RD NS Histrionic 
Explosive NS HA rd NS HA -- Borderline 
Passive-aggress NS HA RD NS Passive-aggress 
Cyclothymic ns ha RD 
Schizoid ns ha rd rd Schizoid 
Passive-depdt ns HA RD HA RD Dependent 
Obsessional ns HA rd HA Obsessive-comp. 
--- -- Narcissistic 
ns HA Avoidant 
HA rd Schizotypal 
NS --- rd Paranoid 
NS --- rd Sadistic 
--- HA --- Self-defeating 
* Predicted high scores upper case (eg. HA), predicted low scores lower 
case (eg. ns). 
** Positive correlations upper case (eg. NS), negative correlations lower 
case (eg. rd). 
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the highest positive correlations with RD, in relation to the other personality 
symptoms. 
It is important to note that there is no consistent method of determining what 
is actually high and low on these dimensions. Most studies have imposed one 
cut-off point, below which is classed as low, above which is high, as opposed 
to having an average band of subjects between these classes. There are several 
methods of determining this cut-off point and it appears to have been left to 
the discretion of the researcher which they choose. For example, it is possible 
to use the research population sample means, normative data means, or 
simply to take the mid-point of the scales themselves. In addition, as Svrakic 
and his associates have done, results can be considered in relation to different 
subcategories of the same group. Each method has the potential to provide a 
different set of results, therefore it is important to ascertain which is being 
used. 
4. COMPARISON WITH THE FIVE-FACTOR MODEL: 
4.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 
Svrakic et al. (1992) also compared the diagnostic power of the TCI with that 
of the Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory (NEO-PI, 
Costa and McCrae, 1985). The NEO-PI is a popular factor-analytically derived 
instrument based on the five-factor model of personality. Before considering 
the results of this comparison, however, it is helpful to consider the five-factor 
model in its historical and current context. 
The five-factor model has its origins in the lexical tradition, which sought to 
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systematise the language of personality. In the early 1960's, researchers began 
to demonstrate five consistent factors of personality, regardless of sample 
composition or the instrument used. The model lay dormant in the 1960's and 
early 70's, however, due to the sustained attack on personality research in 
general, only to emerge again in the 1980's when researchers began to 
reconsider the feasibility of five basic factors of personality (Digman, 1990). 
Recently, the five-factor model has had a great deal of attention in the 
psychological literature (Ben-Porath & Waller, 1992; Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Digman, 1990; McAdams, 1992; McCrae & John, 1992). Some authors claim it 
to be the "grand unifying theory for personality'' (Digman, 1990), while others 
describe it as a "turning point for personality psychology" (McCrae & John, 
1992). Those more sceptical about the model, however, believe it to be a useful 
basis from which to understand certain facets of personality (that is, observer 
ratings), but as a whole, incomplete in its understanding of the complexity of 
human personality (McAdams, 1992). Despite the extreme statements it is 
clear that the five factor model has provided some coherence and clarity in an 
area that has suffered from inconsistency and lack of focus. 
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FIVE FACTORS: 
The nature of factor analysis makes the naming of the five factors problematic. 
As McCrae and John (1992) state, "factor names reflect historical accidents, 
conceptual positions, and the entrenchment that comes from a published body 
of literature and from published instruments" (p. 177). However, some 
consensus has been established and the following labels are the most 
commonly used; 
I Extroversion or Surgency, 
II Agreeableness, 
Ill Conscientiousness, 
IV Neuroticism or Emotional Stability, 
V Culture or Openness to Experience. 
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It is tempting to speculate where the seven temperament and character 
variables fit into this kind of model, however, as will be discussed later, such 
speculation may not be appropriate. What is appropriate, however, is to 
return to Cloninger's initial rationale for establishing three basic dimensions of 
personality, and to speculate on the lack of reference to this five factor research 
as opposed to that proposing three variables. As discussed earlier, there were 
several gaps in the rationale for the recent expansion of the model to seven 
dimensions. From the view point of the five-factor model it is obvious that the 
citation of research concerning the number of dimensions has been selective to 
fit whichever number is appropriate to the model, whereas a full consideration 
of this literature may have added to the new conceptualisation. 
4.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL: 
To return to the five-factor model, however, it has recently been suggested 
that the model has applications in a wide variety of research and applied 
settings; such as clinical psychology, health psychology, temperament studies, 
social psychology, and interpersonal psychology (Wiggins, 1992). In clinical 
settings it has been suggested that the NEO-PI is a comprehensive method of 
measuring both normal and abnormal personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
This was the topic of a recent debate between the authors of the instrument 
and a pair of more sceptical clinicians, Ben-Porath and Waller (1992). While 
Costa and McCrae argued that the NEO-PI provides clinicians with additional 
personality information useful in diagnosis, choice of treatment and 
determining prognosis, their opponents were not convinced that it added 
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anything to traditional methods of personality assessment in clinical 
psychology such as the MMPI and MMPI-II (Butcher, Graham, Tellegen, & 
Kaemmer, 1989). 
Several authors have compared the NEO-PI with clinical measures (Costa & 
McRae, 1990; Schroeder, Wormworth, & Livesley, 1992; Wiggins & Pincus, 
1989). All conclude that the NEO-PI accounts for a substantial proportion of 
the variance in personality disorder symptomatology. However, there are 
several caveats to such a conclusion based on their methodology. Each of 
these studies was carried out with normal population samples, making their 
generalisability to clinical populations questionable (Widiger & Trull, 1992). It 
is important not to underestimate the influence of Axis I and II disorders on 
personality self-ratings and using personality disorder symptoms from 
general population sample runs the risk of doing so. The use of any 
instrument needs to be thoroughly tested on the population it is intended for 
before widespread implementation. 
4.4 COMPARISON WITH THE TCI: 
When compared with the TCI in a clinical population, the information 
provided by the NEO-PI, in terms of risk for personality disorder, was 
minimal (Svrakic et al., 1992). Using logistic regression it was found that high 
Openness scores increased the risk of personality disorder only slightly 
(logistic parameter -.03, Chi-square = 4.7, P= .03). Self-directedness, in 
contrast, was a major contributor (logistic parameter -.12, Chi-square = 16.3, 
P= .0001), while C also contributed (logistic parameter +.12, Chi-square= 6.2, 
P= .01). When the TCI and the NEO-PI were analysed together and age and 
depression were controlled for, however, only SD was a significant predictor 
of personality disorder. Multiple regression analysis found that the NEO-PI 
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explained 40% of the variance in the TCI, but did not adequately explain 
persistence or self transcendence. Svrakic and his associates (1992) concluded 
from these analyses that the TCI has greater statistical power and is more 
comprehensive than the NEO-PI when used with a clinical population. 
Some, however, have concluded that the five-factor model (as measured by 
the NEO-PI) does provide a suitable dimensional model for the DSM-III-R 
personality disorders (Widiger & Trull, 1992). This statement is generally 
made with the caveat of further testing with clinical populations and with 
suggestions to improve its applicability, such as providing a structured clinical 
interview based on the five factors. Widiger and Trull (1992) believe that the 
weight of empirical support for the five-factor model places it ahead of viable 
alternatives such as Cloninger's. Given the so-called atheoretical stance of the 
recent DSM's, this is an important consideration. What such an opinion 
neglects, however, is the advantage of having a classificatory system based on 
causal hypotheses. Such hypotheses are useful not only for the explanations 
they can currently provide, but also for providing a means to discover more 
explicit hypotheses in the future. 
4.5 ADV ANT AGES OF THE TCI: 
Based as it is on factor analyses of self-report inventories of personality, the 
five-factor model provides no explanation of the 'why' of personality 
structure. Proponents of the model do not deny this deficit, stating that the 
model is a descriptive taxonomy of observable characteristics of personality, 
rather than a causal one. In contrast, Cloninger' s model, along with those of 
Eysenck and Gray before him, has gone further in an attempt to define the 
underlying causal structure of personality. More importantly, it has provided 
clear directions as to how researchers may undertake further investigation to 
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support or refute such causal hypotheses. 
In accord with this view, Svrakic et al. (1992) state that it is the TCI' s content 
and aetiological homogeneity that is more important than its statistical power 
and comprehensiveness. Whereas models based on causal hypotheses can be 
expanded according to new evidence, and instruments statistically improved, 
a descriptive model can not always provide the best means from which to find 
causal answers. Svrakic et al. use neuroticism as an example of this, stating 
that it has been demonstrated to be a nonspecific measure of psychopathology, 
confounding personality pathology with disorders such as anxiety and 
depression. In contrast, SD according to this analysis, appears to be a core 
aspect of personality disorder alone, regardless of other psychopathology. 
They also claim that at present the model provides a fuller description of 
behaviours that protect against personality disorder than does the NEO-PI. 
For example, agreeableness in the NEO-PI is measured by one scale only as 
opposed to the five subscales of the TCI's cooperativeness dimension. 
Svrakic et al. (1992) conclude that the model's reliance on biogenetic 
information and the separation of temperament and character provide better 
opportunity to test the causes and development of personality disorders than 
do factor analytically derived models such as the NEO-PI. In such models, 
they state, temperament and character are often confounded, imposing 
limitations on further investigation. By distinguishing character from 
temperament, for example, Cloninger and his associates were able to ascertain 
developmental changes in character variables while temperament remained 
largely the same. It is hoped that the model can provide a similar guide to 
investigating the development of personality disorders. 
It would seem that the major difference between the two models is in their 
organisation of the dimensions or traits. Cloninger has chosen to take a 
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"bottom up" approach, with his temperament and character dimensions as a 
base from which personality is built. The five factor model, in contrast, uses a 
"top-down" approach with its five factors at the top end of a hierarchy, under 
which less central personality constructs can be arranged. In this sense each 
model has something different to offer personality researchers, and for this 
reason neither should compete with the other. In clinical practice, however, it 
appears that the information provided by the TCI does have something to 
offer beyond that of the five-factor model and other clinical instruments. The 
identification of a core construct of personality disorder that can distinguish 
personality disordered patients from other psychiatric patients is an important 
discovery that has several implications for both research and practice. For this 
reason, if no other, it deserves further research attention. 
5. DISCUSSION OF THIS RESEARCH: 
5.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH: 
The study of the TCI using a clinical population has been the first empirical 
test of the theory's usefulness in the context of personality disorders and 
psychopathology. In that sense it is a milestone study for the model as a 
whole. The results have been impressive, despite problems with and 
reservations about the theoretical basis of the character dimensions. What 
then are the implications of these results for the model and its place in the area 
of personality disorders? Svrakic and his colleagues draw several important 
conclusions from this study concerning the definition of personality disorder, 
practical improvements for diagnosis and suggestions for treatment. 
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5.2 CORE FEATURES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER: 
In terms of definition, they state that low SD appears to be a core feature of 
personality disorder. While SD by itself is the greatest indicator of personality 
disorder, some patients scoring highly on SD are still diagnosed as personality 
disordered due to their low C scores. They state that "most individuals with 
personality disorder have difficulty accepting responsibility, setting 
meaningful goals, resourcefully meeting challenges, accepting limitations, and 
disciplining their habits to be congruent with their goals and values. 
However, sometimes highly self-directed patients are diagnosed as 
personality disordered because they are excessively self-centered, socially 
intolerant, unhelpful to others, and lacking in empathy, compassion, or 
principles" (Svrakic et al., 1992). 
These authors propose that with SD and C as core features of personality 
disorder, the TCI can be used as a screening device for DSM-III-R personality 
disorders. These two studies demonstrate that 8% of adults in the general 
population have SD scores of less than 20, and that in clinical samples such 
scores indicate a 90% probability for personality disorder. In addition, 
dimensional TCI scores were shown to be able to quantify the number, 
certainty and severity of personality diagnoses. 
5.3 DIAGNOSING PERSONALITY DISORDER SUBTYPES: 
Once screened for any personality disorder, Svrakic and associates claim that 
the TCI temperament variables can then be used to subtype into traditional 
categories. While Clusters A, B, and C can be defined by low RD, high NS and 
high HA respectively, each personality category is said to have a unique 
personality profile. Svrakic and his colleagues propose the TCI to be a useful 
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diagnostic instrument that is far less time-consuming than traditional methods 
of assessing personality disorder, such as structured interviews. This 
conclusion may be premature, however, in that these results need to be 
replicated, preferably by independent researchers. While the SD and C results 
are impressive in their prediction of personality disorder, and the matching of 
personality extremes to disorders is encouraging, the subtyping according to 
temperament is still far from accurate. For example, these results show 
antisocial, paranoid and sadistic personality disorders to have the same 
temperament extremes, rather than the "unique personality profile" suggested 
by the authors. 
Confounding these results further are the continuing psychometric difficulties 
with the RD and persistence scales, and how these might impact on the use of 
the TCI is not discussed by the authors. Similarly, at this point persistence and 
ST appear to add little to the diagnosis of personality disorder, in clear 
contrast to the other five dimensions. Persistence correlates with only one 
symptom cluster (passive-aggressive), as does ST (schizoid, which only had 
one clear case of the disorder). This finding lends little support to Svrakic and 
his associates' conclusion that the NEO-PI is less comprehensive in a clinical 
setting than the TCI as it does not account for these two dimensions (Svrakic et 
al., 1992). 
5.4 TREATMENT POSSIBILITIES: 
Based on the results from these five dimensions, however, the authors claim 
that the TCI provides the clinician with a comprehensive and individual 
personality profile that is potentially useful in both diagnosis and treatment, 
as opposed to multiple categorical diagnoses that risk the loss of such 
idiosyncratic information. Svrakic and his associates hypothesise that while 
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temperament variables may be amenable to psychopharmacological and 
behavioural interventions, the character dimensions may respond better to 
cognitive, existential and psychodynamic forms of therapy. By separating 
personality into temperament and character, they propose, it will become 
possible to treat the components of personality disorder more appropriately, 
and that a combination of treatments is likely to be more useful with such 
patients than a single one in isolation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Psychobiological Model and the 
Future of Personality Research in 
Psychopathology 
1. OVERVIEW: 
Early in this thesis it was argued that personality information in the area of 
psychopathology, while acknowledged to be important, has suffered from 
several conceptual and practical problems. Those discussed included a lack of 
standardised measurement procedures, a focus on the categorical diagnosis of 
personality disorder, a lack of successful treatment options, and a scarcity of 
clear theoretical guidelines from which to consider these problems. 
Difficulties involved in the classification of personality were then elaborated 
on, with particular reference to the debate over the suitability of a categorical 
or dimensional system. It was concluded that while the dimensional approach 
had much to offer the area of personality pathology, few adequately tested 
models were available to replace the traditional and familiar categorical 
model. 
In subsequent chapters, the work of Cloninger and his colleagues was 
introduced in order to demonstrate how a dimensional model can begin to 
address these problems. The biosocial theory of personality and later the 
psychobiological model of temperament and character, propose a dimensional 
view of personality that integrates normal and abnormal personality structure, 
while still allowing for the categorical diagnosis of extreme personality 
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profiles. Cloninger and his associates have presented evidence for a 
theoretical base from which to view personality that spanned several different 
fields of study. In addition, they have designed psychometric measures so 
that the concepts involved can be empirically verified. Finally, at each stage of 
the theory's development they have offered suggestions for the treatment of 
personality disorder. 
In this final chapter the model proposed by Cloninger and his associates will 
be evaluated in terms of its current and future role in personality research in 
the area of psychopathology. There are still large gaps in our knowledge 
about the development of personality, and many more about the aetiology of 
personality disorder. Although Cloninger's theory does not as yet provide 
definitive answers in this area, it has the potential to yield many interesting 
and productive questions which can then be tested against the theoretical base 
that has been proposed. Questions concerning the aetiology of personality 
disorder that arise from this work will be discussed within the framework of a 
diathesis-stress model of mental disorder. From this, implications for 
treatment will be reviewed with special emphasis on the importance of 
longitudinal data to clarify the process of normal as well as abnormal 
personality development. The potential use of the TPQ and the TCI as clinical 
instruments for the classification of personality will be commented on, before 
the psycho biological approach' s theoretical contribution to the field of 
psychopathology is evaluated. 
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2. THE AETIOLOGY OF PERSONALITY DISORDER: 
According to the psychobiological model, personality is formed by the 
interaction of temperament and character. Temperament is proposed to be a 
result of the genetic inheritance of biochemical mechanisms that control 
individual responses to novelty, reward and punishment. Character, in 
contrast, appears to be more dependent on environmental influences, although 
what these influences are and how they impact on the development of 
personality are not clearly stated. Cloninger and his associates, like others 
before them, have hypothesised an important interaction of genes and 
environment in the development of personality and its related disorders. 
These hypotheses fit within the framework of a diathesis-stress 
conceptualisation of disorder. In other words, personality disorder is 
hypothesised to be the result of a combination of genetic vulnerability due to 
extreme temperament traits (diathesis), and environmental stress in the form 
of negative experiences and/or lack of positive experiences that result in 
character deficits. The model suggests that it is the inheritance of 
temperament variables that create a vulnerability to the development of 
particular types of disorder, rather than the inheritance of genes for the 
particular disorders themselves. This diathesis may not be restricted to the 
development of personality disorders alone, in that the phenomenology and 
course of other Axis I disorders, such as the depressive and anxiety disorders, 
may also be influenced by inherited temperament variables. 
It is possible that many individuals have a genetic vulnerability to certain 
types of disorders, based on these genetically influenced temperament 
dimensions. Only a few, however, have the necessary level of vulnerability on 
this continuum or the particular combination of genetic and environmental 
influences to develop those disorders. Genetic vulnerability and 
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environmental stress, while both important to the development of personality 
disorder, do not appear to be mutually necessary. Cloninger and his 
colleagues discovered this when their research indicated that not all 
individuals with extreme temperament profiles were diagnosed as personality 
disordered (Cloninger et al., 1992). This implies that it is possible for an 
individual without a genetically mediated temperament vulnerability, as 
measured by the TCI, to be personality disordered due to the influence of 
environmentally mediated character variables. 
In order to examine such hypotheses, it is important to be able to make a 
distinction between genes and environment that can be expressed in 
operational terms. Several investigators have attempted to isolate the genetic 
influences of personality, but few have been successful. Cloninger and his 
associates have attempted to do this in their separation of personality into 
temperament and character, and in their design of the TCI. However, there 
are also problems with their conceptualisation, and the dilemma of how to 
determine clearly what is environmentally influenced and what is genetically 
influenced remains unresolved. For example, do the measures of NS, HA, and 
RD really measure the genotypic structure of personality as Cloninger has 
suggested or are they merely representations of the personality phenotype? 
Recent trends in psychology have led to an almost universal acceptance of 
interactional models. Many researchers and theorists have called for the 
dismissal of the nature-nurture controversy in favour of a more sophisticated 
approach that can examine interactional effects of the two and their relative 
influence on various psychological concepts such as personality (Vaillant, 
1987). There are several possible interactions involved in the influence of 
genetics and environment on personality, or in the terms of the 
psychobiological model, temperament and character. The first of these 
involves an additive model, where temperament and character are distinct 
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from each other but combine to form what we know as personality. The 
second sees character as being formed from temperament traits, that is, as 
modifications of temperament variables due to the influence of the 
environment. Finally, temperament and character can be viewed as the 
products of separate developmental influences, but interacting with each other 
in a reciprocal way so that each may modify the expression of the other. 
It is not clear which of these alternatives matches the psychobiological model 
best, as the separation of temperament and character is problematic, and the 
role of the environment, while suggested, is also unclear. It is important to 
note that this lack of clarity is more likely due to the lack of research 
conducted in this area, rather than a theoretical oversight. What the model 
does offer is the opportunity to examine these possibilities further. While it is 
possible that we may never be able to clearly distinguish between genetic and 
environmental influences on personality development, the psychobiological 
model provides the means of testing current hypotheses so that in the future 
we have a more precise basis from which to make more explicit hypotheses. 
In addition, the temperament and character dimensions (as measured by the 
TCI) may be modified to enable clarification of the distinction between genetic 
and environmental influences and enhance accurate measurement. For 
example, the terms NS, HA, and RD, while intuitively appealing to researchers 
and clinicians, have been problematic in several ways. In particular, the claim 
that they are genotypic representations of personality structure has been 
difficult to prove, despite Cloninger's criticism of other personality models for 
their blurring of the genotype-phenotype distinction. The use of the simpler 
behaviourally based terms, behavioural activation, inhibition, and 
maintenance, may have provided a purer conceptualisation of temperament. 
These terms provide a more parsimonious explanation of the neurochemical 
and neuroanatomical research, and are more easily converted into measures of 
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temperament in children and infants. Behavioural maintenance, for example, 
can be measured in terms of physical response to stimuli, whereas RD is a 
more complex construct that incorporates variables such as 'sentimentality' 
which are difficult to observe in young children and more likely to be 
environmentally influenced. 
If temperament is conceived of in these behaviourally based terms, it is 
possible that NS, HA, and RD may be found to reflect phenotypic variation of 
these temperamental substrates as represented by the additive model 
described earlier. The character variables, in contrast, would be more likely to 
represent the influence of social factors on personality that have developed 
separately but interact with the temperament variables. Distinctions such as 
these may help determine the complex process of personality development 
and their influence on personality pathology. 
There is still much research to be done in this area before the impact of 
personality development on psychopathology can be explicated thoroughly. 
According to the latest results from Svrakic and his associates (1992), however, 
self-directedness appears to be a core construct of personality disorder. If this 
finding can be replicated and is demonstrated to be consistent with research in 
other areas such as humanistic psychology, it represents an important 
discovery in the attempt to explain the aetiology of personality disorder. The 
psychobiological model suggests that personality disorder is determined by 
character variables that are influenced mainly by the environment, which 
implies that the environment is a key variable in the development of 
personality pathology. If character is the most important variable in this 
process, it is necessary to consider the types of environmental influences that 
might impact on its development. Used in conjunction with other instruments 
measuring life events and social relationships, the TCI may be able to 
determine trends in the development of personality disorders. While in 
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practical terms this would largely consist of retrospective data gathering, 
longitudinal studies would also be important to further elucidate these 
relationships. 
3. TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS; 
The model implies that while genetic and environmental influences are both 
important in the development of personality disorder, it is character which 
determines the presence or absence of such a disorder. If this is true, the 
psychobiological model has several implications for the treatment of 
personality disorder. For example, if low SD scores are indeed a core feature 
of personality disorder it follows that increasing SD should be an important 
goal of therapy for individuals with these disorders. Given the reliance on 
humanistic psychology in the description of this concept, this discipline would 
seem the obvious choice from which to derive appropriate techniques to do so. 
However, humanistic approaches to the treatment of personality disorder 
have not appeared to have had any greater success than other approaches, 
making this hypothesis problematic. 
It is possible that these approaches have not been researched with personality 
disordered patients, hence there being no mention of its success. A more 
likely explanation, however, is that while SD is an important component of 
personality disorder presentation it is unlikely to be the only facet that 
requires attention. In addition, although touching on this area, humanistic 
therapy may not have had the necessary specificity concerning this concept. 
Therefore while increasing self-directedness may benefit from the 
incorporation of certain therapeutic techniques from the area of humanistic 
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psychology, a more integrated approach to therapy using techniques from 
other disciplines may be more appropriate to deal with the complex 
presentation of personality disordered clients. It is unlikely that any one 
treatment approach holds all the answers in the search for effective treatment 
options for the personality disorders. The findings of Cloninger and his 
associates suggest that while SD should be viewed as an important component 
of treatment, the integration of other approaches is also necessary, and that 
such integration should be based on the individual's temperament profile and 
character variation. 
Including information about personality problems that are based on 
temperament extremes Cloninger et al. (1992) suggest, raises the possibility of 
using behavioural and pharmacological interventions. By focusing on basic 
responses to environmental stimuli, such interventions would hope to modify 
the inherited response biases that are proposed to be causally influenced by 
such temperament extremes. The treatment of character difficulties, in 
contrast, would necessitate a different approach due to the differing 
developmental influences involved. Cloninger et al. (1992) suggest many 
different psychological treatments that may be useful in the development of 
character. For example, they state that cognitive -behavioural techniques may 
be useful in the facilitation of self-directed behaviour, Rogerian counselling 
techniques to develop an acceptance of others, and the use of Jungian analysis 
as a means to attain self-transcendence. Such hypotheses are speculative, 
however, and Cloninger and his associates acknowledge the need for more 
research in the area of the interaction between drugs and psychosocial 
interventions in the treatment of personality disorder. 
If the developmental aspects of the model can be clarified, the 
psychobiological model also has implications for the prevention of personality 
disorder. If specific or general influences on character development can be 
114 
defined that are found to be associated with personality disorder, it may be 
possible to design interventions at an early stage to minimise the risk of 
disorder developing. For example, research literature on the effects of sexual 
abuse in childhood has found that incest is often associated with a disturbance 
in the child's development of his or her self concept, which can result in 
difficulties in the areas of self-definition, self-integration, and self-regulation 
(Cole & Putman, 1992). Related to these difficulties are problems establishing 
a sense of security and trust in social relationships. These authors suggest that 
a history of childhood sexual abuse is common in those with personality 
disorders. Incest, therefore, may be one example of the effects of negative 
. environmental influences on character development. A possible application of 
Cloninger' s TCI is to help discover differences between those with a history of 
· sexual abuse who also have high scores on self-directedness and those who do 
not. In this way it may be possible to determine environmental experiences 
that may mediate the negative influences of sexual abuse on character 
development. 
In order to improve treatment options for personality disordered individuals 
and establish prevention programs for those at risk, longitudinal studies are 
needed to clarify the development of personality itself. Such studies need to 
incorporate measures of both temperament and character in order to gauge the 
relative influence of each on normal development. In doing so it may be 
possible to determine those features of personality development that are 
disrupted in individuals with personality disorders. At the same time, 
longitudinal studies using the TCI would allow further examination of the 
personality stability argument, and verify whether SD and C scores do 
increase over the life span. If so this would fit with the hypothesis that 
personality disorder often decreases as an individual ages and provide further 
implications for preventative measures and treatment goals. 
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4. POTENTIAL FOR CLINICAL USE: 
While the areas of aetiology and treatment of personality disorder remain 
largely untested and unproven, research interest in the classification and 
diagnosis of these disorders has resulted in major improvements over the last 
decade. This area is still problematic, however, and many believe that the 
conceptualisation of these disorders requires a fresh approach. The 
psychobiological theory and the TCI may aid in improving the diagnosis and 
assessment of personality in the clinical setting. 
One of the most important assets of the psychobiological model is its provision 
of a dimensional framework by which to view personality in 
psychopathology. The psychobiological model, by using a dimensional 
system, incorporates both normal and abnormal personality, and enables more 
precise measurement of personality information relevant to the individual. 
The dimensional profile for each individual provides both qualitative and 
quantitative information, much of which would be lost in a categorical system. 
In this way the psychobiological model enables the gathering of personality 
information that is relevant to diagnosis and treatment, which might 
otherwise be neglected because it does not meet criteria for a categorical 
diagnosis. 
As well as document information about personality pathology, the TCI is also 
able to gather information about the more positive aspects of personality. The 
influence of personality strengths on the diagnosis and treatment of 
psychopathology has not received much attention in the literature and clinical 
instruments such as the MMPI are utilised largely for their interpretation of 
personality abnormalities. A lack of adequate measures available to record 
information about personality strengths is one possible explanation for the 
lack of research in this area, but is also likely to be the result of a historical 
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focus on personality deficits and the lack of integration of research on normal 
personality. Use of the TCI in clinical research and practice would enable this 
important area to be researched further. For example, if personality profiles 
according to the TCI can be related to treatment outcome in terms of strengths 
and deficits, this would have important implications for the aetiology and 
treatment of mental disorders. 
Use of information from a dimensional model in the classification of 
personality disorder may also prompt new perspectives in other areas, such as 
the evaluation of treatment outcome. The effectiveness of personality disorder 
treatment has largely been considered in terms of success or failure. 
Dimensional measures of treatment outcome that record the degree of 
improvement or deterioration across a variety of measures may be more 
useful at this stage of our knowledge about treatment. In this way, it would be 
possible to determine which treatments were relatively more effective so that 
they may be further developed, rather than all treatments being categorically 
deemed unsuccessful and as such discarded. At the same time, it would 
enable more precise measurement of the effect of personality weaknesses and 
strengths on outcome measures. 
Within this dimensional framework, Cloninger proposed that NS, HA, and RD 
follow a normal distribution in the general population, with the majority of 
individuals having intermediate values on each. He described the concept of 
an intermediate adaptive optimum, whereby those with intermediate values 
are able to adapt b~tter to different environmental situations than those with 
extreme scores. The new character dimensions, however, do not appear to fit 
this curvilinear representation, based on results from Svrakic and his 
associates most recent study (1992). It appears that the higher the individual's 
scores on these dimensions (that is, the more extreme they are in a positive 
direction), the less likely they are to have a personality disorder. 
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Extremely high scores on the character dimensions, however, may also be 
maladaptive and should not be taken in isolation. It is possible that an 
individual with an extremely high self-directedness score and a low 
cooperativeness score may have a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. 
Similarly, an individual with an extremely high cooperativeness score and a 
low self-directedness score may show signs of dependent personality disorder. 
These hypotheses need to be tested in the future so that the relevance of the 
whole profile in the diagnosis of personality disorder is clarified in addition to 
that of one dimension in isolation. 
Based on our present level of knowledge, the TCI has been demonstrated to 
provide an impressive predictor of personality disorder diagnosis. Based on 
the level of self-directedness and cooperativeness, Svrakic and his associates 
have discovered a non-specific indicator of personality disorder that with 
further testing, may prove to be a key concept for this type of disorder. In 
addition, the temperament measures give some indication of what type of 
personality disorder is appropriate. The authors of the instrument claim that 
subtyping of specific disorders according to their temperament dimensions is 
also possible. However, even the less bold and more accurate suggestion that 
clusters A, B, and C tend to be represented by low RD, high NS and high HA, 
is an important finding. 
A self report measure such as the TCI, which can obtain such information 
relatively quickly and efficiently, provides an excellent screening measure 
from which to further investigate personality in a clinical setting. Ben-Porath 
and Waller (1992) provide some guidelines as to the basic tasks required of 
instruments used in clinical personality assessment. They discuss the 
importance of determining protocol validity, the need for a description of 
stable personality patterns as well as current level of adjustment, and the 
provision of information relevant to diagnosis and treatment. Based on these 
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considerations they conclude that instruments designed specifically for the 
assessment of personality in disordered populations such as the MCMI-II 
(Millon, 1987) and the MMPI-II (Butcher et al., 1989), provide the most useful 
assessments instruments in this area. 
When measured against these criteria the TCI has several potential advantages 
and disadvantages, which will be determined by the results of further 
research. It has already been shown to have potential in the area of diagnosis, 
and the theory it is based on provides some interesting alternatives for 
treatment. It is unclear whether the TCI provides a stable measure of 
personality or whether it is affected by current mental state. In addition, it 
does not provide any validity scales, which may compromise its usefulness in 
psychiatric populations. What the TCI has done, however, is match the 
descriptive based classification system that is in general use to a new 
theoretical foundation that can begin to find answers to the more difficult 
questions of aetiology and treatment. 
Several other modifications and clarifications are needed before the use of the 
TCI can become widespread. One of the most important of these is to 
establish adequate norms for psychiatric populations. Related to this is the 
need for the development of explicit means to determine cut off points for 
high and low scores on the different dimensions. As mentioned earlier, at 
present it is unclear whether to use population means from the normative data 
provided by Cloninger et al. (1991), to use those from the sample being 
studied, or to preset an arbitrary cut off point. Research data from both 
general and specific population samples is required before these questions can 
be answered adequately and it can be accepted as a valid measurement in 
clinical settings. 
Once the TCI has been thoroughly researched, modified, and perhaps had a 
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validity scale added, we will be better able to determine its usefulness in a 
clinical setting. For now, however, we can consider its potential usefulness 
and speculate on further modifications. One such possibility involves the 
conversion of the TPQ to provide an observer-rated measure, which is also 
being acknowledged to be an important part of any personality assessment 
(Ben-Porath & Waller, 1992). The TCI with its emphasis on personal beliefs 
and experiences may be more difficult to rate as an informant measure, but it 
may be possible to rate the concepts according to how they may affect an 
individuals outward manifestation of personality. For example, self-
directedness may be measured according to observations of goal directed 
behaviour. 
At this point of its development, however, the TCI measures provide clear and 
precise information about personality features that might otherwise be 
overlooked in a general assessment. The instrument is relatively easy to 
administer and score, and provides operationally defined and quantifiable 
measures of theoretically grounded concepts that hold the potential for 
communicating knowledge relevant to the treatment and course of particular 
disorders. 
5. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION: 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the psychobiological approach to personality 
and its disorders has several important contributions to make to the 
development of this field. Cloninger and his associates have attempted to 
explain the basic structure of individual personality differences and 
commonalities. They have integrated large amounts of information into one 
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theoretical framework and have provided guidelines for the measurement of 
the constructs involved. In doing so, they have stimulated further hypotheses 
that can be investigated in order to improve our understanding of this 
complex area. As has been highlighted throughout this thesis, the model still 
has many gaps and limitations that prevent a wholesale acceptance of its 
theoretical basis. These difficulties, however, do not so much detract from the 
model's theoretical usefulness, as highlight those areas which need more 
research attention. 
One limitation of the theory results from the attempt to integrate large 
amounts of information from widely disparate fields of research into one 
multifaceted theory of personality. Such a goal is admirable and is becoming 
an increasingly popular course in theoretical investigations. In this case, 
however, it appears that with the incorporation of more perspectives, some of 
the theoretical clarity of the original theory has been lost. For example, 
theoretical concepts from areas such as humanistic psychology have been 
incorporated without full acknowledgment of the issues and controversies 
that have important implications for the psychobiological model. In other 
cases, as Eysenck (1988) has suggested, citation of the literature has been not 
only selective but also careless in the interpretation of studies to fit the theory. 
While the theory incorporates an extremely broad area of information relevant 
to personality, the explanation and perhaps even the understanding of that 
information has sometimes been neglected. As a result, important parts of the 
theory may prove to be simplistic as in the case of the neurotransmitters' 
relation to the temperament dimensions, or arbitrary as the original rationale 
for choosing three dimensions appears. 
The expansion of the model to include seven dimensions, where previously it 
had been argued that three was sufficient, effectively negated part of the 
rationale for the early theory. As a result of further testing which 
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demonstrated that persistence was independently heritable from reward 
dependence, this dimension was incorporated into the model as a distinct 
fourth temperament variable. Yet the initial theory had no rationale as to why 
this should be so, and with the recent addition of three new character 
dimensions, persistence appears to have been neglected. 
Previously, the three original temperament dimensions had been presented 
with a description of their characteristic presentation, hypotheses about the 
neural pathways involved and were placed within an ethological hierarchy of 
development (Cloninger, 1986; Cloninger & Gilligan, 1987). Later, the 
character variables were also fully described according to a neuroanatomically 
based memory system and descriptive literature from humanistic psychology 
(Cloninger et al., 1992). Persistence, however, has had no detailed explanation 
and as such it is difficult to determine its relevance to the model. It does not 
appear to fit with the rest of the model or add anything to the theoretical 
conceptualisation of personality structure and development. It is clear that 
this dimension requires further exploratory work to determine its nature and 
usefulness within the psychobiological model. 
When Cloninger first presented his thoughts in this area, he introduced them 
as a theory of personality. In this most recent presentation, however, the 
theory has been relabelled as a model. Whether this change was made 
deliberately and for what reasons is unclear. However, it can be argued that a 
model makes less of a claim than a theory does in terms of its explanatory 
power or inherent correctness of interpretation, and as such is more easily 
modified in response to research findings and criticism. It is possible that 
Cloninger and his associates, realising the gaps and limitations in their model, 
are subtly acknowledging the work that needs to be done before the 
theoretical base can be more firmly established. The new model is as much a 
theory as the original theory was, but the relabelling may give it the 
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appearance of more flexibility should further modifications be necessary in the 
future. 
While there are many issues that need to be addressed and examined in terms 
of their implications for the psychobiological model, it should be emphasised 
that the theory is still very young. As such it is understandable that its 
presentation has been simplified in order to catch the attention of researchers 
and clinicians. As further research is conducted and comment is obtained 
from those working in other fields, the psychobiological model will be 
criticised, and as a result clarified. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the model, however, is its capacity to 
stimulate research and debate in the area of personality in psychopathology. 
Cloninger and his colleagues have supplied researchers with measures and 
concepts by which to explore many different avenues. All over the world 
groups are using the TPQ to study the influence of personality on different 
areas of psychopathology, including Japan, Italy, Sweden, and the former 
Yugoslavia, as well as America, Australia and New Zealand. Once the TCI is 
published it is likely that it will encourage further research on the model 
which will eventually provide us with a better understanding of the complex 
nature of personality structure and its pathology. 
As an example of the kind of information that can be gained using the TPQ, 
the following is a brief review of a recent study carried out with eating 
disordered individuals (Bulik, Sullivan, Weltzin, McKee, & Kaye, 1992). These 
researchers demonstrated that by using TPQ scores it was possible to 
distinguish between certain subgroups of individuals with eating disorders 
that would otherwise be categorised together. The only significant differences 
between groups when each dimension was considered in isolation were found 
for the RD total and two NS subscales. However, when the group profiles 
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across the three dimensions were examined several important differences 
were discovered. 
Normal weight bulimic women with no history of anorexia nervosa were 
found to be characterised by personality styles that included high NS scores 
(eg. explosive). In contrast, women with current bulimia and anorexia nervosa 
clustered in personality styles that were characterised by high HA (eg. 
obsessive), and those with restrictor anorexia nervosa were identified by high 
RD scores (eg. cyclothymic). Based on these and other personality measures 
Bulik et al. were able to accurately predict which diagnostic group women 
belonged to. They concluded that personality differences may provide an 
important means of distinguishing subgroups of women with eating disorders 
and yield interesting answers as to personality vulnerabilities in the 
development of different eating disorders. 
This study is just one example of many research projects currently being 
conducted using measures from the psychobiological model. Each will need 
to be replicated and there is no doubt that many will find limitations in the 
model proposed. As they accumulate, however, the theoretical and practical 
utility of the model will become clearer. In the above example, important 
information has been discovered which has the capability of reshaping our 
understanding of the role of personality in the development of eating 
disorders and optimal treatments for them. Such research provides exciting 
new directions for further investigations using this model. 
The majority of research to date has come from psychiatrists and has been 
published in psychiatric journals. With the recent changes to include more 
psychological perspectives, however, it is likely that psychologists may 
become more involved in testing the theory in the future. The areas of 
cognitive psychology, learning approaches, humanistic psychology, and 
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personality development, all have expertise that can help clarify the theoretical 
roots of the psychobiological model. 
While the psychobiological model is not the only one from which we can 
further investigate the role of personality in psychopathology, it is nonetheless 
making an important theoretical contribution to this area that cannot be 
ignored. Few personality theorists have managed to merge normal and 
abnormal personality structure adequately into a coherent framework that 
provides the means to explore connections between these two areas. In doing 
so they are prompting a change in conceptual focus, as personality 
information per se becomes as important as information about personality 
pathology. 
The level of research interest in this model will ensure that its contribution will 
continue into the future. There is no doubt that parts of the model will prove 
to be inaccurate, but in the process of being proved false essential information 
will have been gained. Whatever we learn from the psychobiological model, it 
is clear that it will provide new impetus by which we can advance our 
understanding in an area that has been known more for its semantic 
gymnastics and fragmentation, than the innovation, progress, and integration 
that this model promises. 
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